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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The great minds of our day do not trouble themselves with the question of the best way to tune a piano.
Even professional musicians no longer bother with the issue. Many are not even aware that the tuning of
contemporary keyboard instruments in equal temperament resulted from a highly contentious debate that
lasted centuries. A small body of literature on the subject generally views the debate about tuning and
temperament as a series of steps toward the solution of a practical problem. In this literature, the triumph
of equal temperament often is seen as an inevitable teleological end, with its opponents sometimes cast as
benighted partisans of unreason, whose ideological commitments are so extreme as to blind them to the
march of progress. This position, argued most recently in Stuart Isacoff s popular history of temperament, 1
should not be the last word on the matter.
From both a musical and historical point of view, the idealization of equal temperament is highly
questionable; some feel that the music of the eighteenth century and before sounds significantly better in
the unequal temperaments of the day. 2 It seems that the admittedly great practical inconvenience of these
tunings, as well as sheer ignorance of them, prevents players from continuing to utilize them on modern
pianos. But the contemporary dominance of equal temperament has had a distorting effect on the
intellectual and cultural history of the issue as well. The temperament debate was not by any means
confined to musical circles, and the greatest intellectuals of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries made
some contribution to it, often with passion and intense hostility toward their opponents. The array of
illustrious thinkers involved includes familiar names. In particular, Kepler, Descartes, Rousseau, and
Rameau were central. Why were these men so animated by the idea of tuning, a subject that is now almost
entirely forgotten?
The debate about temperament was so fierce for two separate but related reasons. The first has to
do with the status of music as an academic pursuit. Since the beginning of philosophy in ancient Greece,
music has held a central role within the quest for knowledge in the western world. This position was
1
Stuart Isacoff, Temperament (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001).
2
For an aural demonstration of the virtues of selected historical temperaments on CD, see Enid Katahn, Six
Degrees of Tonality, Gasparo, 2000. An older but more thorough vinyl source is J. Murray Barbour,
Meantone Temperament in Theory and Practice, Musurgia Records, 1958.
1
sustained through the millennia by music's privileged position as one of the seven liberal arts that made up
the late Roman, Medieval and Early Modern university curriculum. Historical circumstances, however,
have conspired to sever music from the larger world of science, philosophy, and religion. In our
contemporary milieu, innovations in musical practice and the evolution of musical culture are largely
confined, for better or for worse, to that most modern landscape of adolescence.
The second reason the debate about a subject as obscure as temperament could produce such
contention flows from the older, higher status of music. If music was of central importance to the most
profound metaphysical concerns of a society, there was simply no such thing as a musical issue that was
purely practical. And while the problems of tuning musical instruments have their obviously practical
import, this paper instead will explore the profound philosophical unease that accompanied the
development of temperament as the solution to these problems. This unease manifested itself most clearly
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, roughly during the scientific revolution and the
enlightenment. But while most historical accounts of temperament's evolution view this evolution as a
continuous process, I will argue that the dominant approach to the use of temperament changed markedly
during this period, and specifically that the change from meantone temperament to equal temperament
represented more than simply a refinement of a given practice. I hope to show that a change in musical
temperament was indicative of, and even implicated in, profound changes in philosophical outlooks
between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The transition marked the end of the notion, held dear
since ancient times, that the aesthetic products of man had no meaning or value unless they obeyed
scrupulously the dictates of nature.
2
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CHAPTER 2
WHAT IS TEMPERAMENT?
The most concise definition of temperament is the deliberate mistiming of a musical instrument. To
understand why this would be necessary or desirable, however, the very notion of what it means to be
tune" must be examined. Most people already have an intuitive understanding of this concept: two or
more pitches sounded simultaneously, adjusted so as to blend together harmoniously. If one or more of the
pitches is too high or too low relative to the others, even by a fairly minimal amount, the combination of
tones will be harsh and displeasing to the ear. This is what people describe as being "out of tune."3 But
why is it that notes must be m exactly the right place relative to each other in order to exhibit a sweet and
blending effect? This question has been answered in different ways at different times, and will be explored
in depth below. But for the moment, let us rely on the established intuitive understanding. Just as certain
Supreme Court justices know obscenity when they see it, most people simply know in-tune notes when
they hear them.
While it seems like it would be desirable to be in tune all the time, there is a devil in the details,
and this is where temperament comes into play. To understand why, picture a piano keyboard. This
keyboard consists of an array of black and white keys that divide each octave into twelve notes. Any two
(or more) keys pressed simultaneously will produce a chord. In musical parlance, one of the ways this
chord will be identified is by the pitch-distance, or "interval" between the two notes. Octaves (two notes
that share the same letter designation, like C to C), fifths (C to G), and thirds (C to E) are the intervals that
have been the most basic building blocks for western music since the Renaissance. The numerical
appellation for these intervals comes from the number of steps in the scale between the two sounding notes.
Therefore, C-G is a "fifth" because one must ascend five imaginary notes, from C to D to E to F to G, to
get from one sounded note to the other. The intervals between these lettered notes, whole steps and half
steps, are the smallest intervals in western music. The twelve keys of each octave divide the octave into
twelve half steps.
Now let us apply the conventional understanding of what it means for an interval to be "in tune,"
and imagine trying to tune a piano. With middle C as our starting note, we tune each note in the octave to
3
Another common but technically inaccurate description of this phenomenon is that the notes are "off-
key."
blend with C as harmomously as possible, thereby generating a "pure" interval. Once this is done,
however, the result is a pattern of decidedly unequal stepwise pitch-distances as one ascends through the
twelve notes of the octave. For example, the whole step from C to D will be smaller than that from A to B;
the half step from F to G will be larger than that from B to C. The established pattern of unequal steps
works well enough in the key of C, but if you move to another key, the pattern of uneven steps would lay
on the keyboard in the wrong order, with wider intervals falling m places where narrower ones were
necessary, and so on. Playing such a piano in any key but C would produce music ranging from sour to
horrific. The contemporary solution to this problem is to "temper," or intentionally and very slightly
mistune, all the intervals except the octaves in such a manner that each octave consists of twelve equally
spaced half steps. Excepting the octaves, each interval is as a result a little out of tune for the sake of none
being excessively discordant. This tuning scheme is known as "equal temperament." Equal temperament
has been almost universally accepted by westerners for over a century, and its widespread adoption has
resulted in a collective forgetting of its artificial nature. For contemporary musicians, the equally-tempered
piano mediates and standardizes usable pitches, and does so with authority. Now, an "in tune" interval is
not the purest possible, but rather, it is whatever the nearest piano says it is.
Equal temperament did not emerge all at once and fully formed as a solution to the problem of
usefully dividing the octave. Tuning an instrument in such a manner is a tricky business, a highly
specialized skill that is always left to professionally trained technicians. Even the greatest concert pianists
leave the tuning of their instruments to qualified hired help. Establishing such an intricate system,
requiring a division of labor between performer and tuner, was a long process that took several centuries. It
is a prime example of what the German sociologist Max Weber would describe as a process of
rationalization. For Weber, rationalization was a broad category, denoting a general trend of human
societies toward greater complexity and intricate organization, and away from magical or supernatural
modes of thought. 4 The people responsible for increasing rationalization include just about anyone who is
traditionally understood to contribute to the advancement of a culture or society; at various stages these can
be philosophers, jurists, artists, scientists, and bureaucrats. Needless to say, those who are inclined to
contemplate the intricacies of dividing the octave or building something as complicated as a grand piano
H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), p. 278-335
4
also fall into this camp, and they make their own modest contribution to the overall trend toward the
increased rationalization of society. Also, because the phenomenon of temperament evolved over a long
span of time, with many intermediate stages and culminating in the triumph of equal temperament, its
history is generally conceived as a continuum, a simple example of a rationalization process becoming
steadily more refined. To conceive of it in this way, however, is to efface the difference between the way
temperament functioned in pre-capitalist Europe versus how it was deployed in a capitalist culture.
As a final introductory note, it should be remembered that not all cultures have dealt with the
natural peculiarities of tuning in the same way the West has. India and Indonesia are two notable
examples. Both of these cultures have an ancient "classical" musical practice, one that does not make use
of temperament. In Indian music, the purity of intervals is preserved to the greatest extent possible, even at
the price of certain musical constraints. The drone-note that defines a tonal center similar to the western
notion of "key" forms a weighty anchor; if the tonal center is to change, the music must stop and the
instruments must be retuned. Indian music, in short, takes the route of the hypothetical purely-tuned piano
described above.
The high art-music of the Indonesian gamelan ensemble deals with the issue in a way radically
different from both western and Indian music. The pitches sounded by gamelan instruments are indeed
deliberately mistuned, but not for the purposes of temperament. Instead, the mistiming is even more overt.
The clashing, beating sound of the resulting chords generates what is, to Indonesian ears, an aural texture of
pleasing complexity, and instruments are tuned to maximize the phenomenon. Such a practice renders
Western notions of tuning nonsensical and temperament superfluous; to borrow from Wittgenstein,
Indonesian gamelan music is simply a different language-game entirely. The roots of such language-games
are found deep in the past, and the case of western music and philosophy is no different.
5
CHAPTER 3
THE CLASSICAL LEGACY
The story oftuning musical instruments in the western world begins with Pythagoras, in the sixth century
BC. Much of what is known about Pythagoras and his life is most likely apocryphal, but the tradition of
Pythagorean lore exerted a lasting influence. One of the most famous stones about Pythagoras depicts his
discovery of the phenomenon of consonant tones. Supposedly, Pythagoras happened to be passing by a
large blacksmith's shop, where he heard a discordant clanging of hammers. Occasionally, however, two
hammers would hit together and produce a sweet sound, with their distinct pitches melting together into
one voice. Fascinated by this phenomenon, Pythagoras began exploring it through other media, the most
useful being the monochord, sometimes referred to as a "canon." 5 A monochord consists of a length of taut
string, mounted on a plank, and strung over a moveable bridge that divides the length of string into smaller
vibrating portions. Pythagoras' experiments with this simple musical instrument revealed that the
phenomenon of consonant tones was attained when the bridge was set to divide the string into two portions,
one of which was exactly twice the length of the other. This 2:1 ratio created a strong melting effect,
generating tones we would now describe as being an "octave" apart. Pythagoras derived several other
significant intervals between tones as well, from the ratios of 3:2, 4:3, and 9:8. The contemporary names
for these intervals are now, respectively, the "perfect fifth," "perfect fourth," and whole step (this last
having several interchangeable names such as "whole tone," or simply "tone"). From this agreement
between ratios comprised of small whole numbers and consonant intervals, Pythagoras concluded that
number was a fundamental constituent of the natural world, and the mathematics of music was deemed to
be sacred knowledge.6
Pythagoras and his followers made special use of the perfect intervals, stacking them in various
configurations in order to derive the first systematic tuning.
7
This method of tuning, however, had a very
curious feature. If one ascends in pitch through a stack of perfect fifths, the twelfth ascent of a fifth should
bring one back to the same note, only seven octaves higher. But, this is not what happens. The twelfth
5
Cecil Adkins, "The Technique of the Monochord," Acta Musicologica 39 (1967): p. 34-43.
6
Christoph Riedweg, Pythagoras, trans. Steven Rendall (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 82-83.
7
James Murray Barbour, Tuning and Temperament (East Lansing: Michigan State College Press, 1953), p.
1-13.
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fifth .stead will be significantly shaker than the seventh octave, by a pitch-distance that came to be
known as the "Pythagorean comma." This phenomenon of the comma was mathematically indigestible
during Pythagoras' day. 8 The ratio between the starting pitch and the pitch seven octaves above is
represented by the concise ratio of 128: 1, but the pitch that is twelve perfect fifths over the starting pitch
generates a ratio involving and endless irrational number, and produces an interval that is grossly out of
tune. The mysterious nature ofthis ratio made Pythagoras uneasy, and he declared it to be one of many
pieces of secret knowledge that was only available to initiates in his religious cult. While ancient Greek
mus,c did not run afoul of this problem of incommensurate ratios, it is important to note that, from the very
beginning, theories of tuning musical notes were charged with ideological import.9
Pythagoras may have tried to keep the knowledge about troublesome ratios quiet, but the invention
of the monochord spread, and it was only a matter of time before less discreet characters were wrestling
with the puzzle. The earliest surviving text concerning musical ratios, of questionable authorship, is
traditionally attributed to Euclid. The so-called Euclidean Division ofthe Canon survives in a host of
textual variants in both Greek and Latin, and it exerted a considerable influence over ancient and medieval
music theory. Much of the text is devoted to monochord division and the theory of mathematical ratios, but
the text begins with an innovation, linking Pythagorean number mysticism to a physical process:
If there were silence and nothing moving, nothing would be heard. If therefore anything at all will be
heard, it is necessary first for there to be percussion and motion.
. . Of motions, there are the more dense and
the more rare. The more dense produce higher notes, and the more rare lower. It is necessary for there to
be higher notes, since they are put together from more dense and greater motions, and lower notes since
really they are put together from more rare and fewer motions. Thus, those notes higher than desired are
loosened by subtracting motions and attain the desired pitch; those notes lower are tightened by adding
motion and attain the desired pitch. Wherefore, one must say that notes are put together from parts, since
by addition and subtraction, they attain the desired pitch. All things put together from parts are related to
one another by numerical ratio. .
.
And we know of notes that some are consonant, some dissonant; and the
consonant notes make a single blend from both notes, but dissonant notes do not. .
.
10
This extended passage is important for two reasons. Firstly, it encapsulated the doctrine that would come
to be known as the "fundamental principle of consonance," enshrining the Pythagorean emphasis on
number and the relationship between simple ratios and consonant intervals. Secondly, there is a crucial
The incommensurability comes from multiples of ratios based on differing prime numbers.
9
Isacoff, p. 26-42.
10
Polyglot, The Euclidean Division ofthe Canon, ed. & trans. Andre Barbera (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1991), p. 1 15-1 17.
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.merest in sound was ethical and political. For Plato, muste especially was to have an important role in
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Republic, he argued that exposure to approbate harmony m muste created approprrate harmony ,„ the
soul. Referring to a wholesome regimen of moderate-natured music and exercise, Plato claimed,
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What is most important about music and harmony, far more than its value as an art, is its formative power
over that aspect of the soul that predisposes the soul toward philosophy. And, of course, not all music
would be useful for such inner harmonization. Listening to music that is excessively passionate, or even
listening to acceptably moderate music with unbecoming zeal, is dangerous to the formation of citizens. As
such, Plato recommended that music be tightly regulated, and musical culture be directed exclusively
toward the interests of the polis.
Plato elaborated further on the formative power of music in a later work, the Timaeus. This work
was something of a departure from Plato's usual style. The Socratic exchange here is fairly minimal, and
much of the text is given to long speeches made by Timaeus about the creation of the world by a craftsman-
god, or "demiurge." Such a god was easily assimilated into a monotheistic framework, and thus the
Timaeus would exert a lasting influence on medieval Christianity. One of the claims made by Timaeus is
that sensory perception led man to investigate the cycles of nature through mathematics, and therefore led
11
Plato, Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing, 1997), p. 1047-1048/41 le-4 12a.
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but to serve as an ally in the fight to bring order to any orbit in our souls thathas become unharmonized, and make it concordant with itself. 12
Through the Republic and the Timaeus, Plato established a paradigm for musical thought that would have
lasting influence. This paradigm had three main components. First, musical sounds were part and parcel of
a divinely ordered universe, and like other aspects of this universe, their formal essence could be
comprehended with the aid of mathematics and philosophical reasoning. Secondly, through his meditation
on the harmony of souls, Plato established that man's inner being corresponds profoundly, if not always
perfectly, with the types of musical sound found in nature. Finally, minimizing the imperfection of this
correspondence is, according to Plato, a moral and philosophical imperative that should guide human
musical practice. Failure to do so, Plato contended, would result in a degradation of the soul and threaten
the health of the state.
Plato's philosophical legacy was quite influential in the Hellenistic period, but it did not have as
vital a presence in the intellectual milieu of the Latin Middle Ages. His doctrines about music were
transmitted to Medieval and Renaissance Europe, however, through the works of Ptolemy and Boethius.
While both of these authors are more associated with Aristotelianism than Platonism, their discussions of
music show a clear affinity for Platonic and Pythagorean thought. Ptolemy, the greatest astronomer of
antiquity, produced an extensive catalogue of the various monochord divisions and tunings circulating in
the Greek world, some of which departed from the Pythagorean principal of tuning by stacked fifths. 13
Ptolemy contributed some of his own tunings to the list as well, and many of these divisions made use of
12
Plato, Timaeus, trans. Donald J. Zeyl, in Ibid., p. 1250/47b-d.
13
Barbour, p. 15-24.
9
canons with multiple stings. But Ptolemy's most lasting contribution to Western musiC theory would be
the notion that musical tones and then harmonious combinations were not Simply earthly phenomena. In
Book III of his unfinished work Harmonics,- Ptolemy turns Plato's metaphor of correspondence between
the harmonies of nature, music, and the soul into a literal sc.ent.fic doctrine. The Pythagorean ratios and
then attendant consonant intervals, according to Ptolemy, can be applied in an explanatory framework for a
broad range of natural phenomena, including the soul and the motions of the stars and the planets. Ptolemy
echoed Plato m arguing that souls were characterized by harmomes ofvarying perfection, but the most
perfect harmony was to be found in the heavens. Of particular interest to Ptolemy was the relationship
between the circle of the zodiac and the Pythagorean ratios. Both the zodiac and the double diapason
(double octave) can be divided into four equal portions, 15 with each quarter of the zodiacal circle
corresponding to the interval of the diatessaron (perfect fourth). Ptolemy also offers up thoughts on the
sounds produced by the motions of various planets, and the various consonant and dissonant intervals they
form.
The doctrines of Pythagoras, Plato, and Ptolemy were fused into a single treatise on music by
Boethius, the sixth-century Christian Roman philosopher whose De institutione musica became the
authoritative text on music theory for the next millennium. In this text, the variety of ancient doctrines on
music was presented in an elegant and comprehensive fashion. For Boethius, there were three distinct
types of music, and these were hierarchic in their ordering: musica mundana, perfect cosmic music; musica
humana, the harmony ofbody and soul; and finally, at the lowest and most debased level, musica
instrumentis constituta, the activity of people who sing and play instruments. If the idea that the motions of
celestial objects produced sound was still only strongly implied in Ptolemy, it was made totally explicit in
Boethius. "For how can it happen that so swift a heavenly machine moves on a mute and silent course?" 16
1
Ptolemy, Harmonics, trans. Jon Solomon (Leiden: Brill, 2000).
15
It is important to note here that this division of a double octave into equal parts does not refer to the
modern concept of equal temperament; Ptolemy implies, incorrectly, that the four equal divisions of the
double diapason are pure fourths, or is untroubled by the small gap between a double diapason and the sum
of four diatessarons. This may amount to an inconsistency in Ptolemy's theorizing, given his successful
refutation of Aristoxenus' contention that the octave can be divided into equal pure intervals. See Barbour,
p. 15-24.
16
Boethius, Fundamentals ofMusic, trans. Calvin M. Bower (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p.
9.
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Boethius also reiterated the Platonic idea of the normative power of cosmic harmony. The patterns
established by nature, understood rationally through pure musical ratios involving simple numbers, should
be the basic building blocks of human musical practice. In a chapter entitled "What a mus,cian is"
Boethius states,
How much nobler.
.
.
is the study of music as a rational discipline than as composition and performance Itis as much nobler as the mind is superior to the body.
. . a musician is one who has gamed bSSSrf"
'
7^TTC byrighVniWlt,h^ reaS°n ' n0t thr°Ugh the SerVltude 0f work ' butLough the sovereigntyof speculation, tose of the class which is dependent upon instruments and who spend their entire effort
there.
.
.
are excluded from comprehension of musical knowledge, since.
. . they act as slaves. None of them
makes use of reason; rather, they are totally lacking in thought.' 7
Boethius established definitively for his intellectual descendants that Pythagorean musical science was
rational and speculative, aimed at understanding the makeup of the natural world and the constitution of the
soul. People who merely played instruments were not musicians in the proper sense, and it followed
ineluctably that unless they were content to be regarded as the lowest type of man, they would do well to
conform their practice to the dictates of the philosophers. This prescription would survive through the
entirety of the middle ages, with late medieval treatises by Prosdocimo (1409), 18 and Ciconia (141 1)
19
reaffirming the Boethian notions of cosmic, human, and practical music, asserting the primacy of
Pythagorean tuning by pure fifths, and deriving principles for musical practice accordingly. The musica
instruments constituta may have changed a great deal by the fifteenth century, but the musica mundana
and the musica humana remained eternal.
17
Ibid., p. 50-51.
18
Prosdocimo de' Beldomandi, Brief Treatise on Ratios that Pertain to Music, trans. Han Herlinger
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987).
19
Johannes Ciconia, Nova Musica, trans. Oliver B. Ellsworth (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1993).
11
across
CHAPTER 4
THE ENGLISH, MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS, AND OTHER PROBLEMS
The neo-Boethian theorists cited above were writing as a new musical style was about to sweep
Europe from the north. During the fifteenth century, English muS1C migrated across the channel along with
English nobles in the wake of the French defeat at the battle of Agincourt. As a result, the English style,
parficularly the music of John Dunstable, enjoyed an intense vogue in northern France and Burgundy.
English music had a distinct characterise that, when incorporated into continental practice, would render
the Pythagorean tuning obsolete. This contenance anglcse was the use oftriadic harmony, with a marked
preference for the intervals of thirds and sixths. In the standard Pythagorean tuning of the day, the stacked
perfect intervals created harshly impure thirds and sixths, represented by irrational ratios. As such, these
intervals had been considered dissonances by medieval musicians. But as music all over Europe came to
be influenced by the English taste for consonant thirds, theory needed to be adjusted to accommodate the
practice. Needless to say, such a prospect was distasteful to thoroughgoing Boethians.
The first theorist to propose a tuning that would accommodate the pure thirds of the contenance
angloise was Bartolomeo Ramis De Pareia. In his Musica Practica of 1482,20 Ramis presented a division
of the monochord in which the major third was achieved through the simple ratio of 5:4. Minor thirds, and
major and minor sixths were also derived through relatively concise ratios. These new intervals, combined
with the pure fourths, fifths, octaves and whole tones of the Pythagorean method, formed a tuning system
that came to be known as "just intonation." This system was easier for Renaissance-era singers to use in
their practical application of the monochord, as it was in agreement with the pure thirds that they were
naturally inclined to sing. But by arguing that the uncompromising primacy of tunings derived from
Pythagoras' perfect intervals represented an obsolete metaphysical commitment, the advocates ofjust
intonation sometimes courted trouble. In fact, Ramis was censored and eventually banished by the
religious authorities of Bologna, 21 who considered tampering with the time-honored scheme of Pythagoras
and Boethius to be on the order of sacrilege. For these churchmen, Pythagoras' favored ratios still had a
20
" Bartolomeo Ramis, Musica Practica, trans. Clement Miller (Neuhausen-Stuttgart: American Institute of
Musicology/Hanssler-Verlag, 1 993).
21
Ramis' crossing of the authorities was not confined exclusively to his advocacy of novel tunings, and
partisans ofjust intonation were likely advocates of other new ideas. See Isacoff, p. 95-97, and Barbour, p.
89-105.
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divine status, and the refusal to derive all other pitches from these sacred ratios resulted in widening the gap
between the perfect music of the heavens and the corrupt musical activities of men.
What both sides failed to realize, at least at first, was that just intonation did not represent much of
a departure from the practical difficulties of Pythagorean tuning so much as an intensification of the
problem at hand. Pythagorean tuning mandated pure octaves, fourths and fifths, but these could be
connected melodically by notes that were not necessarily tuned m a simple proportion to the foundational
starting note of a given piece. The dissonance of these stray intervals was easy enough to minimize in the
spare harmonic textures of medieval music; in strictly melodic Gregorian chant, the issue does not even
arise. On the other hand, just intonation, by filling out the octave and giving official recognition to thirds
and sixths, mandated that every note in the octave be tuned purely to the key-note. Just intonation, far from
abandoning a Pythagorean ethos, in fact bound tuning to the dominion of pure ratios even more tightly.
What this meant at a practical level is that the octave was divided into twelve uneven half steps, with a
specific pattern of larger and smaller gaps between notes. If a piece of music borrowed notes or chords
from a different key (chromaticism), or veered midstream into a new key for expressive effect
(modulation), both of which Renaissance music did with increasing frequency, this pattern of unevenly
spaced notes would have to change as well. Singers could make the subtle adjustments required on an ad-
hoc basis, but just intonation would not suffice for the tuning of instruments.
This was a point of increasing significance. Along with the introduction of thirds as consonances,
the new prominence of instruments in the high forms of church music and opera would amplify the
problems associated with tuning. Medieval churchmen, no doubt with some justification, were highly
suspicious of instrumental virtuosity as being a distracting and licentious display of vanity, but this attitude
was fading fast as the Renaissance got underway. While instrumental music would not achieve true parity
with vocal forms until the high baroque period (roughly 1660-1750), the Early Modern musical scene was
clearly characterized by an ever greater use of instruments. Many of these instruments, most notably the
organ, had a pedigree extending back into the early Middle Ages. Lutes and viols were of a more recent
vintage, but their ancestry significantly preceded the Renaissance as well, if in more primitive form. The
refinements in the construction and playing of all these instruments, their elevation from the tavern to the
cathedral and the stage of the aristocratic palace, and their inability to handle just intonation would make
13
Plain .he fac, ,ha, the Pythagorean ,as,e for pare tntervals was gotng to create probletns for the rational
science of music in Early Modern Europe.
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CHAPTER 5
A TROUBLING SOLUTION
While theorists were debating the relative merits of Pythagorean tuning and just intonation, two families of
instruments were developing along hues completely opposed to the positions staked out by either side.
Lutes and viols were exceedingly popular, and the nature of their construction suggested a radically new
way of approaching tuning: equal temperament, a tuning in which the octave is divided into twelve equally
spaced intervals, all of which except the octave are impure and are represented by an irrational ratio. Lutes
and viols, unlike keyboard instruments, do not have a discrete, dedicated string for each note; each string is
in fact responsible for playing a large variety of notes in varying harmonic contexts. Additionally, these
instruments have fretted necks, meaning that they are, like keyboards, fixed in their pitch once they are
tuned. Given the fixed pitch and the multiple duties of each string, equal temperament was by far the most
useful and common tuning for these instruments. 22 But despite the popularity of lutes and viols, they did
not usher in a widespread acceptance of equal temperament. Their tuning and their departure from natural
pure ratios were regarded more as an unfortunate necessity than as the way of the future. According to
Marin Mersenne, the lute was viewed by the musically educated as being the "charlatan of music, because
it passes off as good that which is bad on good instruments."23
But instruments that were "good" had been getting in on the act as well. As noted at the outset
with the example of the purely-tuned piano, keyboard instruments could be tuned in just intonation with
relative ease, given that every note gets its own dedicated string (or pipe, in the case of the organ).
Unfortunately, this would restrict them to playing only in the original, justly-intoned key, rendering all
other keys uselessly out of tune.24 Attempts were made to solve the problem by dividing the octave into
more than twelve intervals; Mersenne's encyclopedic Harmonie Universelle25 describes a keyboard with
sixteen notes per octave, and there were attempts to construct keyboard instruments that were even more
22 Mark Lindley, Lutes, Viols, and Temperaments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 19
42.
23
Ibid., p. 45.
24
It should be noted that in just intonation, with all intervals tuned to the tonic, even some diatonic
intervals (within the key) would not be pure. C-G would be a pure fifth, but D-A would not, etc.
25
Marin Mersenne, Harmonie Universelle (Paris: Editions du Centre National De la Recherche
Scientifique, 1965), Book III, p. 117-119.
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complex. While these instruments would have been a solution to the problem of giving keyboard
mstruments harmonic flexibility while preserving the purity of intervals, they were simply too difficult to
play. Some sort of tempering was therefore unavoidable.
The earhest evidence for the practice of tempering keyboards dates from 1496, and indicates that
the tempering had been a relatively covert affair, employed unsystemafically, and ,n ways that were most
likely umque to each tuner. 26 By the late Renaissance and through the seventeenth century, however,
"meantone" temperament had become the most popular keyboard tuning. The meantone system was a
practical adaptation ofjust intonation, so named because the whole-step interval was derived from an equal
division of a pure major third. There were a large variety of meantone temperaments, all of which had
tempered (flat) fifths and some having sharp thirds. The most popular by far was the % comma meantone
temperament, because it achieved pure thirds by tempering each fifth flat by one quarter of the Pythagorean
comma. Most important, meantone temperaments were the first keyboard temperaments that were openly
and systematically used without apology. They had the supreme virtue of sounding good in a large number
of keys when compared to just intonation, allowing a keyboard to be played in any key with up to three
sharps or flats. And, as far as theorists as well as many musicians were concerned, meantone tuning was
superior to equal temperament because it preserved a fair number of pure intervals, tampering with nature's
perfect, simple ratios as little as was practically possible.
27 One inadvertent legacy of meantone
temperaments is that they resulted in a great deal of differentiation even between usable keys. As keys add
sharps and flats, getting progressively further from the key of C, their chromatic motions will borrow
increasingly from keys that are not adequately in tune. A meantone-tuned keyboard was bright and sunny
sounding, becoming almost shrill as it approached its outer limit of three sharps, while the flat keys became
progressively darker with each flatted note. Going in either direction led to increased dissonance. The
various combinations of pure and tempered intervals produced distinctive "key colors," and each key
became associated with certain moods, associations that would in turn influence a composer's decision
Owen Jorgensen, Tuning the Historical Temperaments by Ear (Marquette: Northern Michigan University
Press, 1977), p. 3-7.
27
Barbour, p. 25-44.
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about which key (and which harmonic modulations) to use for a given piece. 28 To play music of this period
in equal temperament (say, a Scarlatti sonata on modern Steinway piano) thus effaces an aspect of the
musical language that composers were speaking.
By the seventeenth century, equally-tempered fretted instruments, as well as keyboard instruments
tuned in meantone temperaments, had made it clear that an adherence to the pure intervals ofjust intonation
had been completely abandoned as a part of the everyday musical practices of Europe. Temperament, in
some form or another, had become a permanent fixture of the musical landscape. With its heavy use of
chromaticism and its frequent changes of key, European music would have been completely unable to
develop as it did without tempered tunings. But which temperament to use became a matter of some
dispute. By the seventeenth century, larger ensembles almost always coupled equally-tempered lutes or
viols or both with a keyboard instrument that was tuned in a conflicting meantone temperament. The
problem of incompatible tunings was noted frequently, and it was generally conceded that only the most
expert viol players were capable of adjusting to match a meantone-tuned keyboard, and that lutenists
simply must muddle through as best they can. 29 Harpsichordists and organists may have liked the pure
thirds and key colors of meantone temperaments, but these benefits could get rather obscure when there
was a viol player of middling ability howling along in a different tuning. Despite the substantive musical
reasons for sticking with meantone temperaments, they probably would not have been enough to prevail in
the face of generations of frustrated musicians. Why did this situation persist for so long? Asking this
question runs the risk of steering the analysis toward an aesthetic teleology favoring equal temperament,
one that is rife with the usual anachronism. But the strong reluctance of early modern thinkers and
musicians to reach that end cries out for explanation.
28
The associations of certain keys with certain moods would long outlast any physical basis in unequally
tempered tunings, and the cultural resonance of these associations continues, occasionally popping up in
surprising places. Rob Reiner's satirical 1982 "rockumentary" entitled This is Spinal Tap chronicles the
trials of a fictional heavy metal band. In one scene, Reiner interviews Nigel Tuffnel, the band's hilariously
dimwitted guitarist, about his hobby of writing classical piano compositions. Tuffnel plays Reiner his latest
piece, a mournful tune in D minor, duly noting that he has always found D minor to be "the saddest of all
keys.''
29
Lindley, Lutes, Viols, and Temperaments, p. 39-42.
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CHAPTER 6
ANCIENT HABITS OF MUSICAL THOUGHT IN THE "NEW PHILOSOPHY"
US1ng just intonation as a tuning system in European music was clearly impossible, a fact understood by
some thinkers of the seventeenth century. Francs Bacon, true to form, argued that the observable practice
of musicians was a more certain gu.de to musical principles than the long tradition of confused theorizing.30
As for equal temperament, the only enthusiastic supporter was the Dutch mathematician S.mon Stevin,
whose advocacy was marred by his utter ignorance of musical practice and Ms obstinate refusal to
acknowledge that there was, m fact, a relationship between simple ratios and the phenomenon of consonant
tones (Stevin had a tin ear, and a local organist patiently clarified the matter for him). 31 But the vast
majority of seventeenth-century thinkers commonly associated with the scientific revolution favored just
intonation as the best and most natural system, often choosing simply to ignore its inherent difficulties. 32
This privileging of musical theory over practice was an intellectual habit with a long lineage. And
the metaphysics that conditioned it were remarkably durable, as an examination of the thought of Johannes
Kepler will show. Kepler's work was a vital part of the astronomical revolution of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, forming the crucial theoretical link between Copernicus and Newton. His most
important findings involved the nature of planetary orbits and motion, including the discovery that
planetary orbits are elliptical, and that their orbital speed is variable according to proximity to the sun (the
law of equal areas). These concepts would be instrumental to the creation of Newtonian mechanics, but
Kepler accompanied his theory with a revamped notion of Boethius' musica mundana. In fact, one of
Kepler's most comprehensive statements of his theories was a book entitled Harmonici mundi" and the
evocative title is no accident. Harmonici mundi is divided roughly equally between the perennially related
concerns of astronomy and music, and offers an explanation of the true nature of cosmic harmony, one that
is in line with the expanded collection of pure ratios found in just intonation. With the varying speeds of
30
D. P. Walker, "17
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Century Scientists' Views on Intonation and the Nature of Consonance," Archives
internationals d'histoire des sciences 27 (1977): p. 263-273.
31
H. Floris Cohen, Quantifying Music (Dodrecht: D. Reidel, 1984), p. 45-63.
32
Walker, p. 264.
33
Johannes Kepler. The Harmony ofthe World, trans. E. J. Aiton, et al. (Philadelphia: American
Philosophical Society, 1997).
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the planets as they traveled around then elliptical orbits, there are quantifiable maximum and minimum
speeds of planetary motion. The maximum and«m speeds of each planet, of course, form a ratio,
and the planetary ratios roughly correspond to the justly intoned intervals of western mus1C . Unlike
Boethius, Kepler did not claim that the planets make actual sound; rather, he asserted that then motions
contain within them a mathematical relationship with the proportions of earthly music. But Kepler could
not help but get carried away with the analogy, and Book V of Harmonici mundi is taken up with
considerations of such questions as the relationship between the planets and polyphonic harmony, which
planet sings alto or bass, that the planets produce counterpoint, and so on.
As for musica instrumentis, Kepler had much to say as well, though he did not use the Boethian
phrase. Book III of Harmonici mundi explores the traditional question of musical proportions and
monochord divisions. The imperative that earthly music conform to the heavenly template is clearly
operative, but Kepler was surprisingly moderate on the issue, and even half-heartedly accepted the
necessity of temperament. Referring to Vincenzo Galilei's scheme for fretting lutes in equal temperament,
Kepler noted that it was
.
.
.made not in ignorance of the mathematical size of the notes, but with a particular intention. And I indeed
recognize its mechanical function, so that in instruments we can enjoy almost the same freedom of tuning
as can the human voice. However for theorizing, and even more for investigating the nature of melody, I
consider it ruinous; and the effect of it is that the instrument never truly attains the nobility of the human
voice.
The Boethian hierarchy of musical types is clearly implied in this passage, but Kepler clearly endured the
requisites of earthly musical practice with more equanimity than his ancient predecessor. Despite the need
to be fastidious about the mathematical-musical purity of ratios used for speculation, Kepler conceded that
the deviations necessary on a practical level are, more often than not, so slight that inexact human ears are
not enormously bothered by them. 35
Such genial flexibility would not be on offer from Rene Descartes. Kepler's younger
contemporary also wrote a treatise on music, the Compendium Musicae of 1618,36 which remained
unpublished until shortly after Descartes' death. In some ways, this work is strikingly more modern than
34
Ibid., p. 199.
35
Ibid., p. 196-199.
36 Rene Descartes, Compedium ofMusic, trans. Walter Robert (Neuhausen-Stuttgart: American Institute of
Musicology/Hanssler-Verlag, 1961).
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Kepler's. Descartes does not situate music in an astronomical context, and the musical vocabulary is
modern, utilizing the tonal-diatonic method of naming intervals by their degree of stepwise distance within
a diatonic scale, the method still in use today. The structure of the treatise, like much else fa Descartes'
output, is modeled on the geometric proof, and he starts with a small collection of general axioms and
reasons logically from them to arrive at his conclusions.
Descartes' primary interest in music theory was to arrive at an understanding of consonance and
how all musical practice flowed from consonant intervals. Proportion, Descartes argues, is essential for
this understanding, for if the senses are to experience pleasure, "...a proportional relation of some kind
between the object and the sense itself must be present." 37 But for the object to have a pleasant effect on
the senses, it must not overwhelm them in "too complicated and confused a fashion."38 The simple ratios
ofjust intonation are, therefore, the ideal musical sounds. Overall, the Compendium Musicae is a relatively
short and straightforward work that offered up contemporary doctrines in a typically humanist form and
derived its structure from the rationalistic practices of ancient philosophy. The more radical aspects of
Descartes' later philosophy were not yet on display.
Descartes, however, stood by the claims of the Compendium even at a much later date. Fifteen
years after writing it, Descartes wrote two letters to Mersenne in which he referred to the doctrines laid out
in the Compendium. And, it is here that he also made known his views about temperament. In a letter
dated April 1 634, Descartes ridiculed the practice- in any variant- as being absurd. Moreover, the claims of
practical necessity were decidedly seconday to those of natural order as represented by mathematics:
Pour les raisons que disent vos musiciens, qui nient les proportions des consonances, je les trouve si
absurdes que je ne saurais quasi plus y repondre...Car de dire qu'on ne saurait distinguer de l'oreille la
difference qui est entre une octave et trois ditons, c'est tout de meme que qui dirait que toutes les
proportions que les architectes prescrivent touchant leurs colonnes, sont inutiles, a cause qu'elles ne
laissent pas de paraitre a Pceil tout aussibelles, encore qu'il manque quelque millieme partie de leur
justesse. 9
As for the reasons presented by our musicians, who deny the proportions of the consonances, I find them so
absurd that I do not know how to respond. . . Because they say they cannot distinguish by ear the difference
between an octave and three major thirds, then this is equivalent to saying that all the measurements
dictated by an architect are useless, because these measurements do not cease to appear beautiful to the eye,
despite that they may be altered by tiny amounts so as to compromise their integrity.
37
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Aesthetic judgment, m other words, is less important than the requirement that music be built upon solid
mathematics. In another letter dated May 15, 1634,- Descartes got even more exacting in his criticisms,
noting that to abandon major and minor tones through temperament is to violate natural principles (these
tones, among other intervals, inspired those complex keyboards descnbed by Mersenne). The issue having
apparently put Descartes in an rrritable mood, he included basic monochord diagrams showing the
ineluctable character ofjust intonation. Descartes' addressee, no doubt, had tittle need for such remedial
instruction in monochord division. For Mersenne, temperament and questions of tuning were multi-faceted
issues that were worth engaging from both theoretical and practical points of view. 41 But for Descartes,
like Plato and Boethius, only rational and speculative philosophy counted as the work of the true musician.
w
Ibid., p. 256-261.
41 Mark Lindley, "Mersenne on Keyboard Tuning," Journal ofMusic Theory 24 (1980): p. 166-203.
21
CHAPTER 7
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
How much did the stern commandments of theorists like Descartes affect the tuning preferences ofworking
musicians? Such a question is impossible to answer definitively, but Jean Denis, an expert French
keyboardist who was, like Descartes, a friend of Mersenne, can provide some clues. Denis contributed to
the temperament debate with a Traite del accord de Vespinette in 1643. He was an unusual figure among
seventeenth-century writers on music, in that he billed himself as a tradesman, or "master instrument
builder," rather than as a theorist. This was not false modesty. At the outset of the treatise, Denis argues
that the human voice is the measure by which the perfection of instruments should be judged, and that by
that criterion, the harpsichord is "the most wonderful invention in the world." 42 This is quite a flight of
fancy. The human voice is monophonic, flexible in pitch, and capable of continuous sound production such
that it can be ornamented through vibrato and shifts in dynamic levels. The harpsichord, on the other hand,
is polyphonic, fixed in pitch, mono-dynamic (the more elaborate ones were bi-dynamic), and note
production is a point-in-time event followed by steady decay. Aside from drums and percussion, it is the
furthest instrument possible from the human voice.
Denis' claim otherwise can be chalked up to his judgment being clouded by enthusiasm for his
chosen instrument. This befuddlement, however, affords an opportunity to note how the ancient
understanding of the relationship between musical theory and musical practice plays out in a less bookish
context. His manual for tuning the harpsichord advocates for "our familiar harmonic tuning," and gives
instructions for tuning a % comma meantone temperament. Remarking on equal temperament, he writes
At a gathering of very worthy persons I heard this tuning, which I found quite wretched and very harsh to
the ear. When I told them my opinion, and that no one could find this satisfactory, they replied that I was
not accustomed to it. I told them that if someone served them a banquet of tainted, bad-tasting meats and
gave them vinegar to drink, they would have a right to complain... I wished to know what this tuning was
good for. The man who had tuned told me that it was useful for playing the harpsichord, and for
transposing from semitone to semitone, and that all chords were satisfactory throughout the compass, and
that it agreed better than our tuning with the lute and the viol. I told him that he was quite unjustified in
wishing to spoil our good and perfect tuning in order to accommodate it to imperfect instruments, and that
he should instead seek to perfect the lute and the viol, and find a way of making the semitones major and
minor as we have them on the harpsichord.43
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There is a little bit of conceptual confuse here, especially in the description of V. comma meantone as a
"perfect" tuning. Meantone tunings were indeed favored by most theorists and musicians over equal
temperament because they preserved some of the pure intervals ofjust intonation. In this sense they are
more "perfect." But Denis, with his companson between the harpsichord and the human voice, as well as
his inaccurate suggestion that the "harmonic tuning" always has purely tuned major and minor tones, seems
to conflate the two. Regardless of whether Dems' tuning is actually perfect or just more perfect when
compared to equal temperament, it is the purity of the intervals that is the source of the perfection. And the
resistance to matching temperaments with fretted instruments is interesting as well. As Denis' unnamed
opponent understood, nothing has a less perfect sound than instruments playing in conflicting
temperaments. For Denis, however, resolving that conflict by abandoning the pure intervals of meantone
temperament is too great an intrusion of musica instrumentis constituta on the perfection of nature. This is
not as inflexible a position as Descartes' notion that no temperament should be used at all, but it does share
a clear ideological kinship. In fact, Denis is apparently confused that there is any distinction at all between
his position and that of Descartes.
Denis' recalcitrance in regard to equal temperament was backed up by European musicians as a
whole. And, a way of "perfecting" the viol was indeed found: simply get rid of it. The late seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries saw the Italian violin family of instruments steadily displace the viols, and
the demise of the lutes was not far behind. With their fretless necks and unfixed pitch, violins and their
relatives the viola and the cello approached the human voice in terms of flexibility of intonation. They
were thus able to match any temperament, and left to themselves they could even approach the purity of
just intonation. For musicians, the advantages of the violin family were obvious. The project of basing
western music as much as possible upon the pure ratios mandated by nature, a project as old as philosophy
itself and endorsed by the greatest thinkers since time immemorial, had been salvaged. Yet during the
eighteenth century, equal temperament would be adopted anyway. The justifications offered for using the
radically artificial tuning would be illustrative of the changing intellectual climate.
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CHAPTER 8
A THEORETICAL INTERLUDE
The final struggle on behalf of equal temperament took place during the French Enlightenment. And just
as m previous eras, the question of tuning was deeply bound up with larger philosophical issues. One of
the most curious aspects of the temperament debate of the eighteenth century is that both s.des adopted the
language of older theorists and the ideology of naturally ordained tuning to further their arguments.
Despite the fact that both partisans and opponents of equal temperament were essentially arguing for
tunings whose artificial quality differed only by degree, the language of nature and naturalness inflected
their positions at every turn and dominated their thinking. But before exploring the ways in which this
appeal to nature and her principles was highly problematic, it will be useful to consider some aspects of
method in cultural and intellectual history, as well as to highlight some of the larger intellectual changes
that were brought to bear on the question of temperament.
Such a project, hopefully, will not be seen as an intellectually fruitless digression. Until the
eighteenth century, the ideological conditioning that formed views of temperament was fairly clear. The
Pythagorean-Platonic vision of the harmony of the larger universe and the ethical imperative to conform
human activity to the template of nature was always implicit, and often explicit. Even a thinker like
Kepler, who significantly changed the ancient understanding of astronomy, preserved a fundamentally
Boethian outlook about music's relationship with the cosmos. In the case of the modern musical
conception of Descartes, rationalistic principles established the less flexible schema ofjust intonation both
in theory and, so he thought, for the use of actual musicians. In both cases, principles derived from natural
philosophy dictated the practice. During the eighteenth century, however, the connections between
philosophy and temperament would become far more subtle. And as a result, the historical understanding
of the emergence of equal temperament has tended to cede the field entirely to the imperatives of practical
musical necessity. To see why this is an oversimplification of the matter, it will be necessary to resort to
the use of broad cultural analogies.
This type of historical method is now somewhat old fashioned, but it has a long and distinguished
track-record. One of the most striking examples of the fruits it can bear is found in the work of the great
medievalist Erwin Panofsky. For Panofsky, the practice of periodization is a necessary component of
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historical inquiry, and historical period, are defined by the possibility for of making substantive analog.es
between widely derate cultural activities. In his class, study of the relationship between scholastic
philosophy and Gothic architecture,- Panofsky notes the underlying sirnilarities between two apparently
unrelated cultural products. The mam project of scholasticism, according to Panofsky, is the clarification
and synthesis of doctrine and revelation. Such a process was one of enormous complexity, and the acts of
clarification that can be found in scholastic treatises are so ornate that they become almost an end in
themselves. This tendency of minute intellectual organization became the dominant habit of mind during
the high middle ages, and it affected thought and action in many other realms. Panofsky argues that this
scholastic mindset was a strong influence on the Gothic architects; the division of the scholastic treatise
into endless sections and subsections of explanatory argument is very much akin to the Gothic style's
rendering explicit and aesthetically seamless the engineering ideas behind the construction of a cathedral,
the most obvious example being the flying buttress. Panofsky notes that Gothic architects also enjoyed
unprecedented social prestige, being viewed, in some quarters, as honorary academics. The case for the
relationship between Gothic architecture and scholasticism is sealed by the inclusion of a floor plan drawn
up by two of the greatest Gothic masters, which included notations written in unusual and unmistakably
scholastic terms.
The relationship between temperament and Enlightenment thought is of a similar nature to the
earlier cultural connections outlined by Panofsky, and his analogy-laden cultural method can be similarly
deployed. A useful starting point is the work of the philosopher and historian Ernst Cassirer. In his
landmark study The Philosophy ofthe Enlightenment, Cassirer argues that enlightenment thought was
rooted more than anything else in the intellectual achievements of Newtonian physics. Newton had proven
decisively that a broad range of natural phenomena could be reduced to a relatively simple mechanistic
explanation. The resulting physical laws then could be successfully tested and vindicated through further
observation. Cassirer notes that implicit in the Newtonian mindset is that facts about the natural world are
not discrete and derived from principles as they had been earlier; they are instead located within a mutually
reinforcing network of facts unified by a basic understanding:
For Descartes, the certainty and stability of all knowledge was founded in its first principles, while
everything factual as such remained uncertain and problematical. We cannot trust the appearances of
44
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Reason is thus wrenched out of the rationalistic rigidity of the seventeenth century and allowed more
flexibility and freedom, i.e. it must be allowed to improvise responses to unexpected observations and to
digest new scientific discoveries without being hindered by any dogmatic preconceptions. Reason
graduates from being a «... sound body of knowledge, principles and truths" to being a "kind of energy, a
force which is fully comprehensible only in its agency and effects.
. . its most important function consists in
its power to bmd and dissolve."46 For thinkers of the Enlightenment during the century after Newton, the
strong analytic impulse contained in this new style of reason was seen as being essentially unconstrained,
and they brought it to bear on all aspect of the world. As a result, society, politics, government, literature,
and the arts were subjected to investigation and analysis in the same way as the behavior of planets in their
orbits. Old intellectual traditions stood little chance against this powerful new force.
It should be noted that Cassirer does not subscribe to the simplistic explanation of Enlightenment
thought as being a cut-and-dry triumph of empiricism over seventeenth-century rationalism. In fact,
Cassirer sees the seventeenth century and the Enlightenment as forming a continuum rather than being
separated by a rupture. Enlightenment thought continued to exhibit a rationalistic structure, but the former
penchant for geometrically constructed thinking that utilized arrays of axioms and gigantic deductive steps
was abandoned. In its place was a new favor for much leaner logical structures that had a far more
dynamic interaction with observable phenomena, and it was the role of reason to monitor and control this
interaction. Logical principles and deductive proofs were not dispensed with, but there was a new demand
to rely on them less, as well as an expectation that these rationalistic devices would be employed only when
they were clearly capable of organizing empirical observation in a way that would lead to new discoveries.
Enlightenment thought, in Cassirer's words, had made the subtle transition from the "spirit of systems" to
45
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"systematic spirit." This Huid, dynamrc c„„cep„o„ of the relationsh.p beriveen reason and empirtca!
experience created epis.emological prob.ems, however. Once the use of reason had been dtssociated from
me clear mathemattcal grounding of Cariestan rationalism, the namre and validity of reason's products
were open to question, and Ms question became more acute as the Enlightenment progressed. In Cassnefs
words,
Thought cannot turn toward the world of external objects without at the same time reverting to itself- in thesame act it attempts to ascertain the truth of nature and its own truth.
. . We must not gras^at aL llctwhatever and seek to investigate their nature on the basis of our knowledge; our first quest! must be whatkind of objects is commensurate with, and determinable by, our knowledge!47
As Cassirer observed, the influence of Newtonian mechanics was one aspect of Enlightenment
thought, but there was also a skeptical streak among some thinkers about the ability of human rationality
and its ability to comprehend nature, and this tradition would prove decisive in influencing eighteenth-
century thought about temperament. Once again, the impetus came from England, in the work of John
Locke. Locke tends to be remembered now primarily as a political theorist, but during the eighteenth
century, his work in psychology and epistemology was at least as influential as his political thought.
Locke's most significant work on the subject ofhuman cognition was published in 1689, An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding 4* Ultimately, Locke argued in this work that the final and proper end
of human rationality is to discover moral and religious principles, but the work's ethically and religiously
oriented conclusion was based on a revolutionary new psychology, as well as a rejection of the Cartesian
epistemology that had dominated during the seventeenth century. Most important, Locke argued against
the notion that human beings are born with innate ideas, claiming instead that all ideas are instead derived
from experience aided by the senses. At first, it would seem that this is an elaboration of the English
tradition of Baconian empiricism, but Locke had a more complex view of the human mind's ability to
accurately perceive its surroundings.
In Book II of the Essay, Locke posits that cognitions of things outside the mind impress
themselves upon the mind through the senses to form "ideas." Additionally, ideas can be generated
internally through contemplating the ideas already impressed on the mind from the outside. The
correspondence between the objects found in nature and their representation within the mind, however, is
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not total. According to Locke, the "primary qualities" of ideas that we perceive, including solidity, figure,
motion, rest and number, are accurate mental representations of the physical world. But the "secondary
qualities" are not. These secondary qualities include such characteristics as colors, smells, tastes, and
sounds, and "whatever reality we by mistake, attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the objects
themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us, and depend on those primary qualities, viz.
bulk, figure, texture, and motion of parts.
.
,"
49
Secondary qualities cannot be understood as an inherent
property of an object; they are mental effects that result from an object's primary qualities acting upon the
senses. To use a popular contemporary example of the issue, take the question whether or not a tree falling
in the woods makes a noise if there is no one there to hear it. The answer is no: a tree produces vibrations
conducted outward by the surrounding air (or, in Locke's understanding, may produce a violent barrage of
corpuscular motion), but unless an ear and brain is present to perceive these vibrations and translate them
into the sensation of sound, there is no sound. Much of our experience of the physical world is thus a
product of the mind's interaction with its sensory experience.
Locke habitually discussed the secondary qualities of objects as being produced by "powers" of
their primary qualities affecting our senses. This might indicate that Locke envisioned a passive human
mind being acted upon by the objects of nature. But, the notion that secondary qualities are the product of
an interaction between objects and a mind that attributes to objects qualities they do not possess within
themselves implicitly suggests otherwise. Moreover, human minds, Locke claimed, have the ability to
compare, rearrange, and synthesize their ideas in such a way as to produce coherent knowledge. Essential
to this process is the mind's ability to intuit, a priori, necessary causal connections between ideas. The
process of the mind acting upon nature, however, has certain limits in terms of its efficacy. Firstly,
knowledge is confined to the horizon of ideas derived from experience. Secondly, ideas derived from
experience are not always intuitively understandable, and they must sometimes be subject to demonstrative,
rationalistic analysis. Sometimes this is possible, but sometimes our ideas are simply too incommensurate
with each other to allow analytic comparison and judgment. Thus,
...the extent of our knowledge comes not only short of the reality of things, but even of the extent of our
own ideas. Though our knowledge be limited to our ideas, and cannot exceed them either in extent or
perfection; and though these be very narrow bounds, in respect to the extent of all being, and far short of
49
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This new sense that knowledge was condemned to imperfection found its most stnkmg expression
almost a century after Locke in the work of Immanuel Kant. Kant took up the problems posed by English
skepticism, and his philosophical solution to them redefined the goals of epistemology. Locke, in his
discussion of the nature of secondary qualities, had shown that much of what human minds perceive of the
world is in fact not found "in the objects themselves," but rather exists only within the mind as a result of
its interaction with an object's primary qualities. Kant takes the notion one step further, rendering null
Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. According to Kant, we can only understand
"things as they appear" to our minds, and we have no ability to understand "things in themselves." Natural
science, then, is an inquiry looking ".
.
.not to things in themselves (the properties of which we pass by), but
to things as objects of possible experience, and the totality of these is properly what we here call
nature.
.
."
51
Judgments about nature are merely judgments about our own mental constructs, which
masquerade as real representations of the natural world.
Hence if the pure concepts of the understanding try to go beyond objects of experience and be referred to
things in themselves.
.
.
they have no meaning whatever. They serve.
. . only to spell out appearances, so
that we may be able to read them as experience. The principles which arise from their reference to the
sensible world only serve our understanding for use in experience. Beyond this they are arbitrary
combinations without objective reality... 52
As Kant makes clear, just because we have no access to objective reality is no reason we cannot glean
useful knowledge from our immersion in the world of experience. And, the worth of this knowledge is
measured not through its accuracy- such a measure would require access to knowledge of things in
themselves, which Kant claims to be impossible- but through its utility. This epistemological turn was
clearly implied by the very nature of Newtonian science. Newton's laws of motion were completely shorn
of causal explanation. They did not explain why things happen, they simply predicted with unprecedented
accuracy what would happen in the future if certain conditions could be specified. The lone "cause" in
Newtonian mechanics is "gravity," a force that, somehow, empowers bodies of mass to affect each other's
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motions even at extraordinarily large distances. The question of why or how bodies rmght exert this mutual
influence on each other was left completely open to speculation. But the sheer usefulness of Newton's
laws, usefulness that stemmed from their awesome predictive capacity, sent the issue of cause to the back
burner. In fact, the utility of Newtonian mechanics tended to mask the fact that the question of cause
altogether; when the laws worked so well, gravity simply must exist as Newton conceived it.
The sea change in natural philosophy and epistemology that began with Newton and culminated in
Kant represented both a gain and a loss. On the one hand, the scientific advances of the late seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries were undeniable. But on the other, there was a new sense that to fully understand
nature was a project doomed to perpetual imperfection. There was during the Enlightenment a growing
awareness that the workings of the human mind could never allow a pure, objective, unmediated access to
the workings of the natural world. As forged by Locke and Kant, the new view was that our concepts of
the world around us are in fact synthetic creations existing only within the human mind, and that these are
produced by the mind's own operations upon given sensory data and with an eye toward utility. Man does
not perceive nature so much manufacture his own useful picture of it. This view, paradoxically, is not a
piece of anti-scientific epistemological nihilism. It was an entirely reasonable conclusion inspired by the
dramatic new pace of scientific advancement. A culture saturated with expectations of rapid scientific
progress cannot possibly enshrine its contemporary understanding as a timeless, objective, and immutable
truth. The prospect of revolutionary new discoveries in the future inevitably relegates current knowledge to
a provisional status. In such an intellectual atmosphere, the old thinking about tuning and temperament
would be revisited.
30
CHAPTER 9
JEAN-PHILIPPE RAMEAU: THE NEWTON OF MUSIC
There was no musical thinker who embodied the spirit of the Enlightenment as fully as Jean-Ph,hppe
Rameau. Rameau would become the foremost advocate of tuning keyboards using the equally-tempered
system commonly found on fretted instruments, but his position arose only after his most revolutionary
publication about harmony, and it was very much a result of the new theoretical paradigm that he
established. Rameau was hailed by the philosophes as the "Newton of Music," and while that was quite a
grand title for an inarticulate and insecure organist from the provinces, the honor was not undeserved. In
his 1722 Traite del'harmonie,53 Rameau recast the prevailing understanding of harmony, replacing the
preexisting schools of thought on the subject with a greatly simplified doctrine. Rameau's notion of the
"fundamental bass" and the attendant concept of chord inversion were akin to Newton's theory of gravity,
in that one organizing principle was able to explain and illuminate a huge range of chords and harmonic
functions that had previously seemed unrelated. A summary of Rameau's analysis of how bass lines and
chord inversions are constructed will probably feel a bit rudimentary; this is because Rameau's theory is
now known simply as basic "Music Theory," and it is not until students of music theory reach a fairly
advanced level that they are exposed to anything else. For the simplest illustration of Rameau's
achievement, take the notes C, E, and G. Before Rameau, the harmonic function of this group of notes was
understood to be defined by whichever note was the lowest in pitch. If E was the bass note, this group of
notes was interpreted as being a species of E chord. Given how many three-note chords can be assembled
on the keyboard, this led to an enormous range of chord types and labels. In a post-Rameau world, no
matter what the arrangements of the notes C, E and G might be, C is understood to be the "fundamental
bass" whether or not it is lowest in pitch. In more modern language, C is the "root" of the chord. The
nature of a harmonic progression becomes defined not by the progression of the actual bass line, but of the
fundamental one.
Rameau's observation about the roots of triadic chords may seem straightforward now, but in the
years after 1722, it had the effect of consigning most pre-existing harmonic theory to the dustbin.
Rameau's Traite also made the study of harmony seem to be, for the first time, more elemental than the
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study of counterpoint (the pracfice of combin.ng independent musical lines). But cunously enough g.ven
his radicalism, Rameau would base all his theorizing in the Trait, on the diatonic sca.e in just intonation.
The first secfion of the TraUe is an extens.ve overview of the relationship between consonant intervals and
simple rafios that had been the foundation of mus.c theory since Pythagoras. This overview is updated, of
course, by the introduction of consonant thirds and sixths, but overall, the section is remarkably traditional
for such a revolutionary work. There is no mention of temperament anywhere, despite the fact that the
musical practice Rameau inher.ted and updated required at the very least the use of a meantone
temperament. There are two explanations for this lapse, one be.ng the strong influence of Descartes on
Rameau's early theorizing. While Rameau may have been dubbed the "Newton of Music" by the
philosophy in 1 722 he was still heavily Cartesian in his thinking about the role of pure ratios as the proper
basis of music theory. 54 The other possibility is that Rameau was not entirely aware of the contradiction
between the just intonation advocated in the Traite and the musical practice of his day. Rameau's time as a
professional musician had so far been spent as an organist, and therefore he did not have to confront the
practical problem of tuning his instrument on a regular basis like other musicians.
Despite the absence of any discussion of temperament, the first section of the Traite does cover a
subject that would be relevant to the issue in Rameau's later work. As mentioned above, Rameau's
revolutionary new theory of harmony was grounded in the concept of the "fundamental bass," and Rameau
wanted to give this notion the status of a physical fact of nature. To do this, Rameau turned to the
undivided string as an example, and used the phenomenon of sympathetic vibration to argue that the octave
was a generative source of the other intervals. Rameau used the example of a vibrating string on a viol,
most likely because using a little extra muscle on the bow makes the described phenomenon most apparent.
.
.
.si Ton prend unc viole dont les cordes sont assez longues pour pouvoir en distinguer les battemens, Ton
y remarquera qu'en saisant resonner une corde avec un peu de violence, cclles qui seronl plus basses ou
plus elevees d'une octave, trembleront d'elles-memes, au lieu qu'il n'y a que le son aigu de la quintc qui
tremble, & non pas lc grave ; ce qui prouve que le principc de l'octavc est confondu dans les deux sons qui
la formcnt, & que celuy de la quinte, & par consequent de tous les autrcs intervales, reside uniquement dans
le son grave & fondamental. 55
If you take a viol with sufficiently long strings, and sound a note with a fair amount of force, strings
sounding an octave higher or lower than the note will vibrate as well. But as for the fifth, only strings
54 Thomas Christiansen, Rameau and Musical Thought in the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge
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sounding a fifth higher will vibrate, and those lower will stay still. This proves that the octave is theprinciple sound and that it contains within it both other notes (octave anS tatoftB fflS aswell as all the other intervals, resides in the lower and fundamental sound. ' '
A given note audibly creates the intervals above it, meaning that bass notes are the constituent element of
harmony. For Rameau, whose focus on the primacy of harmony was unprecedented, this was offered up as
nature's endorsement of his theory. Moreover, since it was harmony that was the most fundamental
musical fact of nature, Rameau argued, the prime concern of the musician should be to exploit harmonic
resources to their fullest. As a composer, Rameau famously put this dictum into practice, writing some of
the most harmonically adventurous music of the mid-eighteenth century.
By using an appeal to nature to justify the shift toward a harmony-centric theory of music,
however, Rameau created an intellectual dilemma that would take him two more treatises to sort out. The
problem lay precisely in the generative capacity of the bass note. Rameau was correct to observe that a
note does contain within it audible higher pitches. This phenomenon, later known as "overtones" or
"harmonic upper partials" had been known since ancient times, and had been the subject of intense
speculation by early modern thinkers. Descartes and Mersenne were particularly interested in overtones,
and surmised with great prescience that these probably had something to do with the phenomenon of
consonant tones.
56
But it was the work of Joseph Sauveur that established the modern understanding of
overtones with a presentation to the Paris Academie in 1701.57
Sauveur's great breakthrough was the understanding that strings can vibrate simultaneously in
different directions. Previously, a vibrating string was understood to have moved in one direction only,
oscillating in arc-like motions from one side to the other. But Sauveur discovered that within this primary
motion were a considerable number of secondary motions, motions often contrary to the fundamental one.
These smaller, secondary motions were responsible for sounding the overtones, and this solved the ancient
puzzle of the phenomenon of consonance. Consonance was not a mystical property flowing from ratios,
but turned out to be the product of one pitch's having overtones that sound in unison with another pitch
and its overtones. Rameau did not know of Sauveur's breakthrough until just after the publication of the
Traite, but Sauveur's work confirmed much of the advanced speculation on the subject, including that of
56 Cohen, p. 155-156.
57
Christensen, p. 135-139.
33
Rameau cited above. The problem, however, was that the most prominent of these overtones sounded the
pure intervals ofjust intonation. Rameau was stuck having used an appeal to nature to justify the primacy
of harmony as a primordial fact, while simultaneously advocating a use of harmony that he now realized
was utterly at odds with the pure intervals ofjust intonation and the overtone series.
Rameau confronted this dilemma using two arguments, one of which was pure sophistry, the other
of which was quite ingenious and had much in common with the epistemology of Locke and Kant. In both
cases, the arguments were vitally intertwined with Rameau becoming the first prominent advocate of equal
temperament. Rameau elaborated on his harmonic theory in two other major theoretical works, the
Nouveau systeme de musique theorique etpractique of 1726, 58 and the Generation harmonique ou traite de
musique theorique et pratique of 173 7.59 In these works, Rameau incorporated the work of Sauveur, and
expanded the idea of the fundamental bass, making it even more central to his harmonic theory. In the
Nouveau systeme, Rameau forced the contradiction found in the Traite to further extremes, advocating the
use of meantone temperament while simultaneously arguing that the overtone series was nature's mandate
for harmonic flexibility. By the publication of the Generation harmonique, Rameau was a partisan of equal
temperament, basing his advocacy on new ideas.
By 1737, the notion of the fundamental bass had undergone some evolution, some of which was
substantive but much of which was rhetorical. In the Nouveau systeme, Rameau utilized Sauveur's work
on overtones and rechristened it the "generative fundamental," meaning that the fundamental bass was a
note that contained within it the notes of its appropriate harmony. In the Generation harmonique, a work
as much dedicated to acoustics as to harmonic theory, Rameau would explore the generative fundamental
as an example of the "corps sonore," or sounding body, observing that any pitch-producing object, whether
or not it was a musical instrument, rang with several secondary, higher pitches. Once again, this notion
was employed to argue for nature's justification of harmony as the most fundamental constituent of music.
Since the existence of the corps sonore meant that harmony was a fact of nature, Rameau argued, it
naturally followed that equal temperament, with its ability to render every key in tune, would be the most
useful way of exploring harmonic possibilities. But what of the objection that the corps sonore sounded
59
Jean-Philippe Rameau, Nouveau systeme de musique theorique (New York: Broude Bros., 1965).
Jean-Philippe Rameau, Generation Harmonique (New York: Broude Brothers, 1966).
34
the intervals ofjust intonation? This rather glaring problem was S1mply wished away, with Rameau
claiming that the corps sonore only contained the perfect twelfth (perfect fifth plus an octave) and the
major seventeenth (major thud, plus an octave). These, claimed Rameau, were the only givens rn nature,
and it was the job of human mus1Cians to apply them to music. If the alterations of temperament were
necessary, then this only underlined how it was the fundamental bass that was the mus,cian's fundamental
anchor.
60
Clever as this argument may have been, it was, unfortunately, sheer nonsense, flying in the face
of all previous musical experience, scientific evidence, and even Rameau's own assertion in the Traite that
the octave contained within it the source of the "fifth as well as all other intervals." Needless to say, no one
was persuaded, not even Rameau's most steadfast supporters, and Rameau's refusal to retract this stand
came at some cost to his reputation as a natural philosopher. 61
But Rameau's other principle justification for equal temperament was considerably less shallow.
And relying as it did on an obscure discovery by a seventeenth-century philosopher, it provides a useful
illustration of the Newtonian intellectual climate of the Enlightenment. As we have seen, most of the major
intellectual figures associated with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century were partisans ofjust
intonation. Even Kepler, who conceded that temperament might be useful for earthly music, viewed pure
intervals as a natural template and the only system that should be used by theorists of both music and
astronomy. Christian Huygens, however, made an interesting discovery about just intonation, but he did
not seem to recognize its implications. Huygens noted a curious occurrence when a choir sings a certain
progression of intervals: starting at C, moving up a fifth to G, down a fourth to D, up a fifth to A, down a
fourth to E, and down a third to C. This succession of notes, if sung slowly in a series of perfectly tuned
intervals, will result in the last C being an entire comma sharp to the first. 62 If the choir sings the
progression quickly, however, a collective memory of the starting pitch will force it to sing one or more
intervals impurely so as to return to the same C from which it started.63 Huygens concluded the obvious,
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that this was the reason the tome pifch of even very skilled a cappella choirs sometimes drifted, especially
at slower tempi. But the more important implication is that since even the completely flexible human voice
had to utilize tempered intervals somewhere while singing a purely melodic line, just intonation was not
particularly useful as a theoretical ideal. Even Kepler's planetary choir would have trouble singing in just
intonation. But Huygens did not make this leap, and continued on as an advocate ofjust intonation being
the most valuable theoretical model, whatever small adjustments may be necessary in practice.64
Rameau, however, seized on this musical example as a justification for equal temperament. In
Generation harmonique, Rameau dedicated a lengthy chapter to the question of temperament, and the
contrast with earlier writers on the subject could not be more pronounced. Whereas thinkers from
Pythagoras to Descartes had first codified the just proportions of nature and then used these as a
prescription for musical practice (with varying tolerance for the practical necessity of small deviations),
Rameau began with the question of what humans need to do with music. And the most basic need is to
create harmony grounded by the fundamental bass. In order to do this, temperament is a necessity rather
than a compromise. To illustrate, Rameau uses a slightly simpler succession of intervals than Huygens,
beginning and ending on G.
Sans doute que Pimpression re?ue du premier sol, comme fondamental.
. . reste a l'oreille jusqu'au dernier,
& qu'en consequence elle conduit la voix, qui tempere d'elle-meme la consonnance en question, ou peut-
etre toute, pour arriver a Tunisson du premier. . . C'est done encore la succession fondamentale, & son
harmonie qui guide ici l'oreille ? N'en douton plus ; tout le confirme. 65
Without a doubt, the impression received of the first G, the fundamental sound. . . remains in the ear until
the last, and as a consequence, the ear conducts the voice and makes it temper the consonances in question,
or possibly all of them, in order to arrive at the end in unison with the first note. . . Is it thus the
fundamental succession and harmony that guides the ear? No more doubting; it is all confirmed.
Thus the human mind, instead of conforming its practice to the dictates of nature, is operating on the
sensory data it receives from nature in order to generate a more useful result. The most useful result, in
Rameau's view, was the unfettered motion of the fundamental bass and its attendant harmony, something
only possible on keyboard instruments when using equal temperament. And the utility of this system is
such that it can be used to improve even the human voice, whose tendency to sing pure intervals can lead it
astray from the fundamental bass.
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n n y a done que la succession fondamentale, & son harmonie sous-entendue, qui puissent guider l'oreille& la vo.x en consequence. .
.
L'oreille ne suit pas servilement le temperammenUesZZ» elle a
,
particuher
;
ces .nstrumens servent seulment a la mettre sur les vo.es des sons fond™ ux par euxmemes, ou par quelques-uns de leurs son harmoniques, d'ou prenant Tessor, elle tempere an rTfiexTontout ce qui peut s'opposer aux justes rapports de ces sons fondamentaux 66 '
"
It is only the fundamental succession and its attendant harmony that can guide the ear, and thus the vu.ee
well... The ear does not follow slav.shly the temperament of mstruments
8
it has its own part.cular J.ngW ! H K } ' InStr""lemS SCrVe °nly t0 Steer the ear t0 the "amenta! sounds, via these sounds or
Z"Z^7Zl: The ear then takes fllght ' and—ly tempers - • • ™y—- »--
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So thorough is this mediating effect of equal temperament, argued Rameau, that after a while the ear does
not even notice the artificial substitutes for pure intervals. Tempered intervals become, in Kantian terms,
the "things as they appear," comprehensible and subject to human manipulation, while the pure intervals of
nature are akin to "things as they are," forever inaccessible but whose loss ultimately leaves man in a
higher state of empowerment. This picture of the nature and utility of temperament is the exact reverse of
Kepler's thinking. Kepler had seen temperament as a useful innovation for allowing instruments to
approximate the flexibility and greater perfection of the human voice, and on a higher order, the harmony
of the spheres. Rameau, by contrast, is arguing that the approximated intervals of equal temperament allow
the voice to throw off the yoke of pure intervals and their power to distract the ear and the mind from the
progression of the fundamental bass. In Rameau's theory of temperament, the needs of artistic man had
overcome the dictates of nature.
To be sure, Rameau did not understand his own theory in quite such incendiary terms. In his
understanding, the primacy of harmony and the succession of the fundamental bass were mandated by
nature via the presence of the overtone series. But as we've seen, Rameau's reasoning that his harmonic
theory and its necessary temperament were "natural" in some uncomplicated way was clearly
wrongheaded, both to Rameau's contemporaries and to posterity. In spite of all this, however, Rameau's
arguments prevailed, and his audience saw the revolutionary import of his theories despite the occasional
Cartesian window-dressing. Rameau's genius at codifying harmonic practice according to simpler rules
was unassailable, as was his originality as a composer. As far as the case for equal temperament, this was
eventually triumphant as well; despite its artifice, equal temperament's utility was undeniable, and as such,
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Rameau's sometimes faulty arguments were helped along by the Zeitgeist that prevailed mrdway between
Locke and Kant.
The rarefied air of philosophy was not the only thing propping up Rameau's rhetoric in favor of
equal temperament. Other cultural developments were analogous as well. One of these was the
emergence, most visible in England and France, of what would later be known as the "public sphere." In
his classic historical study of the phenomenon,67 Jurgen Habermas explored how a whole series of new
social and political phenomena came to redefine the relationship between the absolutist governments of the
eighteenth century and their subjects. These phenomena formed a public sphere, a necessarily ambiguous
realm which essentially mediated between the people and the apparatus of the state. "Public opinion" was
the product of this sphere, and even monarchs, in theory absolute and ruling by divine-right, found
themselves needing to consider public opinion when making decisions of state that had formerly been made
at their discretion.
Although the genesis of the public sphere had been in privately circulated trade broadsheets and in
the reading public that consumed early news papers, the ultimate locus of the classical public sphere in
France was found in the salons and coffeehouses. In this milieu, a stratum of intellectually engaged men,
often of disparate social classes, discussed the latest news, literary fashions, and philosophic innovations.
In such an egalitarian setting, distinction was attained by wit and conversational skill rather than social
rank. As a result, one of the defining features of eighteenth-century French society was the cultivation of a
distinctly "sociable" sensibility as well as the fine art of conversation.
This cultural development found a musical expression. The increasing harmonic fluidity of
eighteenth-century music went hand-in-hand with a more "sociable" musical style as well. A collection of
distinct new genres appeared that became collectively known as "chamber music." Played by a variety of
small instrumental ensembles most often formed by amateur musicians (the most popular being the string
quartet), chamber music at first was seen as music not for performing, but for playing at social gatherings.
And, the music itself was understood explicitly to be modeled on conversational dynamics. The melodic
focus of the music was thrown from player to player, with everyone getting a chance to hold forth and
contribute to the exchange, while the others "listened" to the speaker with simple accompanying figures.
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One of the primary reasons each speaker could say something interesting, and what enabled the group as a
whole to elaborate endlessly on the muS1cal "topic" at hand, was the constant, circulating shifts of harmony
that allowed a melodic idea to be examined from many different angles. What chamber music represented,
with the help of the expanded harmonic vocabulary made possible by equal temperament, was a veritable
salon of notes.
Rameau's case for the primacy of harmony and the attendant need for equal temperament had a
powerful impetus from economic change as well. The analog between the evolution of temperament and
the larger structures of capitalist organization is particularly apparent in the increasing importance placed
on ease of circulation. 68 Theories of monetary circulation were advancing at a quick pace during the early
eighteenth century, and there was an increasing realization that the nature and value of money was less
connected with the physical properties of currency than had been previously thought, i.e. a coin was
valuable not so much because of its weight in precious metal, but because it served as an abstract symbol of
exchange-value. This value was guaranteed above all by the existence of a distinctly sociable order,
meaning one that was ideally a collection of rational actors who understood the mutual benefits of
circulating currency, among other things, and could regulate their day-to-day conduct accordingly, without
need for the forceful intervention of the state.
Rameau's emphasis on the fundamental bass and the need for equal temperament was above all a
program for increased harmonic circulation. With equal temperament, this circulation could be completely
unhindered, much like currency. As historian Daniel Gordon observes,
. . .the abandonment of "just proportion" in harmony is parallel to the abandonment of the idea that money
must have an intrinsic value. In each case, a fixed idea of correspondence between two things gives way to
a more free-floating concept of value. In the case of money, the face value becomes separate from the
substantive value. In the case of music, individual sounds are tuned without regard to the ideal
mathematical intervals. In both cases, the change allows for greater circulation. In music, the
abandonment of pure intervals makes it possible not only to increase the number of chords, but also to
modulate among them. . . This means that a single frequency or "tone" can become a formal element or
"note" in a variety of chords and keys. . . Without temperament, the letter C could be used as a sign in a
variety of keys, but the tones corresponding to it would not be the same. This is to say that the
characteristically circular movement of Western music- the process of beginning with a "home" key and
moving through a series of harmonic changes until one arrives back at the beginning- would be impossible
without temperament. It would be like spending a dollar with the knowledge that one will never receive the
same kind of currency back.
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It is improbable that Rameau was well-versed in the economic theory of his time, but many of the
philosophes who read his theoretical work probably were, and the analogy is striking. Just as monetary
value dissociated itself from the physical properties of metal coins and became abstract, so the corrupted
intervals of equal temperament were abstracted from pure intervals, serving as a representation of their
musical value and facilitating a circulation of keys. If the realization could be made without leading to
social chaos that even something as concrete as money was in fact a useful abstraction, was there anyone
who would get seriously exercised about letting a slightly sharp third stand in for a pure one at the
keyboard? As it turns out, there was.
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CHAPTER 10
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU: RESISTING THE ARTIFICE OF MODERNITY
By the mid-eighteenth century, the momentum toward equal temperament was considerable. In addition to
being endorsed by the era's most prominent mus,c theonst, the theory and practice behind equal
temperament had striking analogs in Enlightenment epistemology, the new social and political organization
of eighteenth-century Europe, and theories of economic circulation. To most people examining the
question, this array of conscious and unconscious justifications for making equal temperament the standard
tuning for keyboard instruments was persuasive. But it was for precisely these same reasons that one
eighteenth-century thinker set himself against the practice. For Jean-Jacques Rousseau, equal temperament
was one of many emblems of modernity, and unlike most of his fellow philosophes, Rousseau did not view
modernity in a positive light. Rousseau's negative assessment of equal temperament, however, was not a
simple-minded or uninformed one. Like Rameau, Rousseau's thinking was enmeshed within a complicated
array of philosophical ideas. Rousseau, however, was far more consistent, and his vehement
pronouncements on temperament marched in lockstep with his overall critique of modern life.
At first glance, one is tempted to conclude that Rousseau's musical views tended to flow from his
philosophy, but the lines of influence are not wholly clear-cut. Rousseau's activities as a musician have
now become a footnote to his career as a political philosopher, but Rousseau began his adult life as a
professional musician, and he considered this his primary occupation even during the years of his greatest
philosophical output. Rousseau's musical career, however, was not one of unchecked success. He moved
to Paris in 1741, armed with a new system of musical notation that met with little enthusiasm. Even more
discouraging was the treatment the young composer received at the hands of his idol, Rameau. Both
characters were prickly, insecure, and socially awkward, and their relationship got off to a bad start. In
1745, upon hearing Rousseau's opera Les Muse galantes, Rameau publicly accused Rousseau of
plagiarism, Rameau's reasoning being that significant portions of the opera were so badly composed that
Rousseau could not possibly be the author of the parts that displayed some talent. Their strained
relationship grew worse later that year when Rousseau was commissioned to adapt one of Voltaire's
dramas to a score penned by Rameau. Rameau interfered with the project heavy-handedly, only to
withdraw angrily from the project after much of the labor was completed. To make matters worse,
41
Versailles. 70
The of relatjons wjth Rameau durmg ^ _ ^ ^^^^
•» between Rousseau and Voltaire duri„g ,he_^ „ ,_ ^^ ^ ^
.wo figures of formattve lnfluence tha, Rousseau embarked ^ ws career ^ a^ pWiosophCT ^
burn was mspired by an essay conlest spo„sored fcy^^ rf^ ^ |^ ^^^^^
*" fe " «" "* " >Ubl*d
-
•*
-* in 175,. to «. essay, Rousseau
argued tha, modern sconce and an were highly destmctive of indtvidual morals and a society's general
level of virtue. Girding ,his assertion was an appeal ,„ htstory, in which Roussean ehromeled the deeline of
soeia. health in the face of scientific and arfistic advance His favorite example was the decadence
prevalent to tmperial Rome, but Rousseau appealed also to tbc history of Greece and Egypt before
Pillorying the culture of modern Europe as well. No society was spared, and Rousseau displayed none of
the customary deference accorded to classical art. Of all the virtues that decline in the face of advanced
science and art, Roussean focused most on martial values. Cultural sophistication required leisure for both
production and consumption, and this necessary leisure led to in short order to a lifestyle of luxury and
effeminate softness.
The content, not to mention the ranting tone, of Rousseau's first Discours was peculiar, given his
occupation. The reader can be forgiven for assuming that the author never had, nor wanted to have, any
association with any kind of contemporary artistic product. But in several places, the first Discours
displays a logic that is highly suggestive of prescriptions for contemporary artists.
On ne peut reflechir sur les mceurs, qu'on ne se plaise a se rappeler l'image de la simplicite des premiers
temps. C'est un beau nvage, pare des seules mains de la nature, vers lequel on tourne incessamment les
yeux, et dont on se sent eloigner a regret. 73
One cannot reflect upon morals without being pleasantly reminded of the image of simplicity of earlier
times. It is a beautiful shore, decorated by the hands of nature, where one always turns ones eyes, and feels
regret at turning them away.
John T. Scott, Introduction to Collected Writings ofRousseau Vol. 7, trans. John T. Scott (Hannover:
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Rousseau was a musician before writing these lines, and he continued to be one afterwards. Thus it can be
concluded that his unprecedented denigration of mankind's artistic legacy was not an attempt to eliminate
the arts from human life, but was instead a call to rehabilitate them. Nature and a primitive simplicity
uncorrupted by the accretions of civilization would be the key ingredients to the new aesthetic, and
Rousseau would spend the rest of his career as a musician, critic and philosopher exploring the implications
of this doctrine. Given Rousseau's antagonistic personality, much of this exploring would come in the
form of grand polemics. His target would be modernity in general, embodied in the twin evils of urban
capitalism and the unnecessarily complex harmony of French music.
Rousseau began his assault on the latter by writing music according to the aesthetic precepts
embodied in the first Discours. The result was the opera Le Devin du village, written and premiered in the
spring of 1752. This work represented a complete break with French tradition and its greatest living
exponent, Rameau. For one, there was none of the elaborate staging or ballet routines that had become a
ritual of the Paris stage. As for the plot, the libretto portrays a vision of country life as natural and
uncorrupted by urban society as possible. Suitably, the text was set to a score of unusual harmonic
simplicity, and the work consists of lightly accompanied recitative, as well as arias based on melodious and
peasant-like songs featuring regular and highly repetitive phrase structure. These characteristics render Le
Devin du village rather unappealing to a modern audience, but among the French public of the middle
eighteenth century it was extremely popular, and it became one of the most widely performed operas of the
day. Rousseau finally had the musical success appropriate to his ambitions.
The new musical direction Rousseau took in composing Le Devin du village was replicated in his
music criticism as well. His most famous output as critic came during the during the so called "Guerre des
boufons" that erupted after the first Parisian performances of Pergolesi's comic opera {opera buffa) La
Serva Padrona in late 1752. This was a protracted critical debate over the relative values of French and
Italian opera, and pitting as it did partisans of a native style against a foreign one, it was animated by a
large amount of nationalist resentment. Rousseau became the greatest champion of the Italian style; he
liked the Italians' simpler harmonic accompaniments and believed that Italian as a language had a far
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greater melodic character than French and thus was a better vehicle ofpassion « Rousseau's role in the
Guerre des boufons was the first pubhc and explicit attack on the legacy of Rameau, and the two would
engage in a lengthy exchange ofprinted polemrcs on every conceivable mus1Cal matter for several years
afterward. In fact, it is safe to say that Rameau and his legacy was the implicit target of all Rousseau's
subsequent writing on music. Given the volume and philosophic sophrsticarion of this writing, this was
perhaps the most elaborate backhanded compliment ever paid by one composer to another.
In the wake of Rousseau's success as a composer and his notoriety as a music critic, he was again
inspired to turn toward political philosophy. In his 1755 publication Discours sur L origine de
Imegalite,15 Rousseau expanded on the themes offered up in the first Discours and created a much more
coherent philosophical document. The negative critique of modern arts and sciences was now
supplemented with an indictment of advanced economic organization as well. Although Rousseau never
used the phrase, it is in this work that he laid out his enduring portrait of the "noble savage," an early man
whose innate goodness had yet to be corrupted by society. Early man, Rousseau argued, lived as a part of
nature and was truly free of greed and vice, indeed free of anything but the hardships imposed by life in the
wild, and even these had the virtue of strengthening both his body and his character. But this early state, in
which the only inequalities between men were inborn, soon gave way to one in which inequalities were
imposed by man. The real revolution was the division of labor that produced agriculture, metallurgy, and
the realization that one individual would find it useful to have more than another. As a result,
Le premier qui ayant enclos un terrain s'avisa de dire ceci est a moi, et trouva des gens assez simples pour
le croire, fut le vrai fondateur de la societe civile. 76
The first to fence off a piece of land and thought it a good idea to say this land is mine, and found men
naive enough to recognize this declaration as legitimate, was the true founder of civil society.
Once started, this acquisitive trend proceeded apace. When private property and the need for dividing labor
arose, laws and men to enforce them became necessary. These, in turn, conferred strength over the poor by
the rich, and ultimately the legal apparatus of the magistracy allowed the weak and the poor to become
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enslaved. To Rousseau, it was contemporary civilization, its finely graded legal system, and its highly
regulated economy of labor that represented the culmination of the process.
Just as in the first Discours, however, Rousseau did not env,sion the possibility of a return to the
edenic state of early man, and instead hinted that contemporary ills may in the future be rectified.
Referring to the slavery in which "advanced" man was held, he noted that it was,
n'nl^ir
16
' ^ li^aUt6' Ct 16 terme au<*uel ab°utissent enfin tons les autres, jusqu'a ce que deouvelles revolutions dissolvent tout-a-fait le gouvernement, ou le rapprochent de l'kistitution legitime. 77
...the final type of inequality, and the ultimate result of all the others, until future revolutions dissolve
every aspect of the government, or rework it into a legitimate institution.
Rousseau's nostalgia for the state of primitive man, which had at first been brought to bear on the project of
reforming the arts, had by 1755 grown into a comprehensive revolutionary ideology, one that advocated the
complete overhaul of contemporary political life and the emerging capitalist order of eighteenth-century
Europe.
As noted above, the connections between economic and musical thought in Rameau's theories
was, at best, subconscious. But in the case of Rousseau, his most detailed account of his philosophy of
music stems from a lengthy passage that was originally to be included in the Discours sur I 'origine de
I 'inegalite. Reworked and expanded, it became the Essai sur I 'origine des tongues.™ In this essay,
Rousseau synthesized the musical aesthetics forged in his operatic composition and his advocacy of Italian
opera, as well as the critique of modernity found in the Discours that was
simultaneously primitivist and prescriptive. Rousseau's starting point was once again an assertion about
the prehistoric origins and behavior of man. The birth and development of early language, according to
Rousseau, had to have been rooted in the emotional and moral passions, since communication based
entirely on physical gesture would have been sufficient to meet the needs of survival.
De cela seul il suit avec evidence que 1 'origine des langues n'est point due aux premier besoins des
hommes. . . D'ou peut done venir cette origine ? Des besoins moraux, des passions. Toutes les passions
rapprochent les hommes que la necessite de chercher a vivre force a se fuir. Ce n'est ni la faim ni la soif,
mais l'amour, la haine, la pitie, la colere qui leur ont arrache les premiers voix. Les fruits ne se derobent
point a nos mains, on peut s'en nourrir sans parler, on poursuit en silence la proye dont on veut se repaitre ;
Ibid., p. 317.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Essai surl'origine des tongues (Paris: Gallimard, 1990).
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This is sufficient evidence that the origin of languages was not primarily from the needs of men WW
The first spoken language, claimed Rousseau, would have been poetic and probably half-sung, and it would
have served first and foremost as a conduit of human emotion. Given this picture of early language, it
follows that the most primordial element of music is not harmony, as Rameau argued, but the melody of a
single human voice.
Eventually, however, this pure melody that was intimately entwined with communication and
action was corrupted, and the poetic musical power of prehistoric speech was lost as language advanced.
Along with the loss of early freedom that came with the onset of divided labor and private property, writing
was invented, and as a result, language became both more precise and less passionate. Something of the
passion of primitive musical speech, however, could be retained with a concerted focus on melody in
music. Thus it is the composer's job to tap into melody's passionate and ultimately moral force as single-
mindedly as possible, or else run the risk of catastrophic aesthetic failure. And, restoring the primacy of
melody is not only a musical imperative but a political one as well. The conclusion of the penultimate
chapter of the Essai, on the subject of music's degradation, and the concluding chapter, on the relationship
between language and government, are connected by a remarkable chain of logic:
Voila comment le chant devint par degres un art entierement separe de la parole dont il tire son origine,
comment les harmoniques des son firent oublier les inflexions de la voix, et comment enfin, bournee a
l'effet purement phisique du concours des vibrations, la musique se trouva privee des effets moraux qu'elle
avoit produits quand elle etoit doublement la voix de la nature. . . Ces progres ne sont ni fortuits ni
arbitrages. . . Les langues se forment naturellement sur le besoins des hommes. . . Dans les anciens terns ou
la persuasion tenoit lieu de force publique l'eloquence etoit necessaire. A quoi serviroit-elle aujourdui que
la force publique supplee a la persuasion ?... Les langues populaires nous sont deveniies aussi parfaitement
inutiles que l'eloquence. Les societes ont pris leur derniere forme ; on n'y change plus rien qu'avec du
canon et... donnez de 1'argent... 0
Here is how singing increasingly became an art entirely separate from the speech from which it originated,
how harmony has caused us to forget the inflections of the voice, and how, at last, confined to an entirely
physical effect of agreeable vibrations, music was deprived of the moral effects that it had when it was also
the voice of nature. . . This progress is neither fortuitous nor arbitrary. . . Languages form naturally from the
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Rousseau's extreme views about the nature of music, melody, harmony, language and politics
would find their way once agam into prescriptive form in his Dictionnaire de musique, polished in 1768. 8 '
This work was inspired by Rousseau's nearly immediate dissatisfaction with the hastily written articles on
music that he had contributed to Diderot and d'Alembert's titanic Encyclopedic One of Rousseau's
biggest regrets about those articles penned in early 1749 was that he had succumbed to the deference his
editor Diderot felt toward Rameau. 82 This deference is, to put it mildly, non-existent in his Dictionnaire.
Rousseau's entry on harmony has barely begun before he is disparaging Rameau's claims about the natural
sanction of his harmonic system. This, however, is merely the starting point; Rousseau applies the logic of
the Essai sur I origine des langues and argues boldly that any harmonic practice at all is patently unnatural,
perhaps to the point of perversity.
Quand on songe que, de tous les peuples de la terre, qui tous ont une musique & un chant, le Europeens
sont le seuls qui aient une harmonie, des accords, & qui trouvent ce melange agreable
;
quand on songe que
le monde a dure tant de siecles, sans que de toutes les nations qui ont cultive les beaux-arts, aucune air
connu cette harmonie
;
qu'aucun animal, qu'aucun oiseau, qu'aucun etre dans la nature ne produir d'autre
accord que l'unisson, ni d'autre musique que la melodie. . . il est bien difficile de ne pas soupconner que
toute notre harmonie n'est qu'une invention gothique & barbare dont nous ne nous sussions jamais avises,
si nous eussions ete plus sensibles aux veritables beautes de l'art, & a la musique vraiement naturelle. 83
When one imagines that, of all the peoples of the earth, who all have music and singing, only Europeans
have harmony and chords and find this mixture of notes agreeable; when one imagines that the world has
lasted many centuries, without any of the nations who have cultivated art having known this harmony; that
animals, birds, or any other natural being produce no chords other than unison, and no music other than
melody. .
.
it is hard not to suspect that all our harmony is a gothic and barbarous concoction, which would
never have happened had we been more attuned to the veritable beauties of art and the true nature of music.
As a composer and as a critic, Rousseau was of course not quite as inflexible on the question of
harmony as this quote might suggest; in practice, he regarded harmony as an unfortunate and irritating
necessity, a device to be used as sparingly as possible. But his general distaste for harmonic complexity
along with his emphasis on the importance of melody in music would inevitably affect his views on
temperament. His entry in the Dictionnaire on temperament advocates for the use of an unspecified
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In the Dictionnaire S temperament entry, Rousseau also took the opportunity to criticize Rameau's
advocacy of equal temperament, duly offering the usual complaints- the lack of natural simplicity and the
mtervals represented by umformly irrational ratios- but it is his appeal to the judgment ofmusicians and
instrument makers that holds the most force. Commenting on equal temperament, Rousseau states,
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In regards to the organ makers, they find that a keyboard tuned in such a manner is not as well tuned as M
Rameau assures us. The major thirds to them sound harsh and shocking, and when one tells them they will
have to alter the thirds much as they previously had done to the fifths, they respond that they cannot
conceive how to disguise the beats that will sound in this manner of tuning, or how the ear will not be
pained. Given that, because of the nature of consonances, a fifth can perhaps be more altered than a third
without making beats and shocking the ear, is it not suitable to put the alteration on the side where it is less
shocking, and to leave more just the intervals that cannot be altered without rendering them more
discordant?
What is interesting about this eloquent plea for the continued use of an unequal temperament is how
conventionally conservative it is, both in reasoning and in language. After letting loose one salvo after
another on the steady and total degradation music has suffered at the hands of harmony since very ancient
times, it is somewhat odd to see Rousseau resort to a logic regarding temperament that mirrors the
customary thought of the seventeenth century. After all, even meantone temperaments were developed
precisely to facilitate harmonic flexibility, albeit on a lesser scale than equal temperament. If harmony, and
the temperaments of all sorts that have facilitated its development, has had such debilitating effects on art
and politics, why not get rid of it entirely? Europeans certainly had not yet lost the capacity to write or sing
purely melodic music.
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This inconsistency on Rousseau's part would be resolved by his Jacob.n descendants during the
French Revolufion. Rousseau famously gave voice to the totalitarian .mpulse in his work Du Control
Social, where he proposed that in the republic of the post-revolutionary future, any man foolish enough to
oppose "la volume generate" ("the general will") should be "forcera a etre libre"85 ("forced to be free").
While Robespierre and the Committee for Public Safety unleashed the Terror on those who refused to
conform to their Rousseauist vision of republican freedom, Rousseau's ideas about harmony and melody
were put into action as well. In a process mirroring the conception of Le Devin du village, operas were
stripped down to highlight simple, singable melodies, and audience participation in singing along with the
anthems was encouraged to an unprecedented extent. Harmonically complex symphonic music was
officially discouraged, particularly the style streaming out of that corrupt den of royalist reaction otherwise
known as Vienna. At a time when anyone suspected of aristocratic tastes was in mortal danger, such mild
disapproval was effective. The greatest musical expression of Jacobinism came with the mass fetes of the
period, where huge numbers of citizens sang in unadorned unison. The chief Jacobin musical aesthetician,
Jean-Baptiste Leclerc, attempted to have harmony banned altogether. It was the ultimate expression of
Rousseau's philosophy of natural music. As soon as the Terror ended, however, artificial harmony
resumed. 86
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CHAPTER 1
1
DISPARATE INTENTS, UNITED EFFECTS
Despite the fact that Rousseau's philosophy of muS1C would be backed by the guillotine, he would lose the
day on the specie question of temperament. His horror at the ever greater distance human societies were
traveling from then natural state would be echoed elsewhere, but few people resisted the onset of
modernity with the sincerity of Rousseau. By the autumn of Rousseau's life, the austere and simple
musical style that he had helped establish would become laden with harmonic and contrapuntal complexity
at the hands of Viennese composers like Haydn and Mozart. As such, meantone temperaments became
hopelessly obsolete, and the expanded harmonic possibilities afforded by equal temperament would unleash
a round of musical development over the next century that no doubt would have inspired in Rousseau a
profound despair.
One of the reasons equal temperament triumphed, however, was that both Rameau and Rousseau
had inadvertently conspired to completely divorce the question of temperament from the rules of nature.
Rameau ardently believed that equal temperament was mandated by nature and the corps sonore, but the
philosophic rationale he marshaled for this position was so transparently untenable that usually people read
his work and concluded the opposite. At the same time, Rameau argued persuasively that adopting equal
temperament was necessary and beneficial for advancing musical practice, and the analogues the
innovation had with other man-made cultural phenomena such as philosophy and money seemed to have
cancelled out the effect of Rameau's sophistry of naturalism. Rousseau, on the other hand, argued with
spectacular effectiveness that not only was equal temperament unnatural, but so was harmony as well as all
European musical activity as it existed. Man's natural music would never be recaptured, and the best
mankind could hope for was a distant approximation. Even in Rousseau's committed hands, however, the
approximation was still so distant from the natural state, and so close to the corrupt practice that he
pilloried, that his philosophic argument was compromised. In their steadfast commitment to conforming
musical practice to nature's perfection, both Rameau and Rousseau helped sever music from metaphysics.
In their wake, the question of temperament would become anthropocentric, and entirely practical.
50
CHAPTER 12
A FIN DE SIECLE POSTLUDE
Once the question of temperament had become practical, it was more or less forgotten. Over the
course of the mneteenth century, concerns about temperament essentially disappeared from musical
d1Scourse except for those areas that specifically dealt with tuning instruments. Issues surrounding
temperament still mattered to piano tuners, obviously, but they rarely registered with composers and
players. The effects of equal temperament, however, guided the development of nineteenth century music
like an invisible hand. European music had, like most music, always revolved around an anchoring pitch.
The nature of this attachment changed over time, but during the course of the Early Modern period, this
was manifested in what came to be called the "tonal" system. This was the familiar notion of a key,
defined by a central "tonic" pitch, by the major or minor scale beginning on that pitch, and with a
secondary center of gravity at the dominant pitch at the fifth scale degree (this last being a clear
Pythagorean remnant). Meantone temperaments established patterns of pure and impure intervals arranged
to heavily reinforce the central role of the tonic pitch, most of all the pitch labeled C. Abstract and man-
made harmonic conventions regarding the tonic key-centers had a physical embodiment in meantone
temperaments. By 1800, this physical embodiment was gone.
Equal temperament dissolved the physical basis for the tonal system. It was, and usually still is,
used to play tonal music. But its unlimited harmonic flexibility encouraged a departure from tonality.
During the second half of the nineteenth century, Wagner and his descendants exploited the harmonic
freedom of equal temperament to its fullest, writing music that cycled through large numbers of often
distantly related keys, sometimes barely letting one key settle before destabilizing it with chromatic (out-of-
key) notes and using them to modulate to yet a new key. In the profusion of chromatic notes and
unpredictable harmonic swerves, the starting tonic ceases to have much force as an anchor, and its role as
an organizing principle becomes quite nominal. The rules that had developed to govern the composition of
tonal music since the Renaissance became ever less binding in the face of such freedom, and tonality itself
became ever more superficial. By the close of the nineteenth century, this produced a palpable feeling of
crisis. The most radical composers felt that the old rules of harmony as codified by Rameau were being
stretched to the breaking point. This artistic crisis contributed, at least in small part, to the generally
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gloomy mood of4.)^ and it would inspire several composers to experiment with abandoning
tonal mus1C altogether on the eve of the First World War. Just as Newton's legacy would be drssolved by
Einstein, Rameau's would be dissolved by the atonal revolution of Arnold Schonberg.
The role of equal temperament in bringing about this state of affairs was infrequently remarked
upon and largely unnoticed, but it was well understood by Max Weber. His meditation on the subject
forged an interesting reconciliation between the stances of Rameau and Rousseau, 87 and it was based on an
extremely learned store of ethnomusicological data, ranging from the European tradition to intimate
knowledge of chanting practices and folk-songs from most inhabited continents. Weber essentially
concurred with Rousseau's view of melody as being man's primordial and irrational instinct, although he
presented a much more comparative and empirical version of the argument. But Weber made room for
Rameau and the champions of harmony as well, arguing that the impulse to progressively, perhaps
artificially, rationalize all aspects of life is what defines the West against other cultures. While he had no
use for the idea that harmony was a preexisting natural fact, Weber saw Western harmonic practices and
the tempered tuning systems they required as the prime example of the rationalization impulse applied to
music
Despite having effected an essential reconciliation of the aesthetic dispute between Rameau and
Rousseau, Weber wrote more in the spirit of the latter than the former. In music as in most areas, Weber
had deep misgivings about the Western capacity for rationalization. Weber lived during the era when
tuning pianos in strict equal-temperament had become a nearly universal practice, and this atmosphere was
ideally suited to the increasingly atonal direction that European music took in the wake of Wagner.
Observing this trend prompted Weber to remark,
There is no doubt that the distance principle which is akin to harmony and which is the basis of the
subdivision of the intervals of our keyboard instruments, has an extensively dulling effect upon the delicacy
of listening ability. The frequent use of enharmonic exchanges in modern music has a parallel effect on our
harmonic feeling. . . To be sure, repeatedly it has tended to place our music in persistent dragging chains. 88
87 Max Weber, The Rational and Social Foundations ofMusic, trans. Dona Martindale, et al. (Carbondale
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This statement is clearly Ion with Weber's other famous metaphor, that modernity represents man's "iron
89
cage." Just as with the growth of science, capitalism, and bureaucracy, Weber was uneasy about the
directs music was taking as a result of ever-increasing rationalization. While Weber's musical treatise
was published just before Arnold Schonberg had made his name, one can be confident that the atonal
revolution of the second decade of the twentieth century is something Weber would have found profoundly
disquieting.
The unease about the direction of modern music was not confined to intellectual circles, nor was
the unease about the dullmg effect of equal temperament. The greatest classical guitarist of the twentieth
century, Andres Segovia, offers in his autobiography an oblique but visible endorsement of Weber's
conclusions. As a young student in Cordoba, Segovia befriended the Monserrat family, whose fetching
daughter Laura would give the young guitarist his first serious introduction to large amounts of canonical
piano repertoire. Segovia loved the music, if not the instrument:
I was deeply saddened by the fact that the guitar, an instrument so rich in shading and so suited to the
dreams and fantasies of a composer, should be so lacking in beautiful works such as these. . . The piano,
which surpasses all other instruments in the number of works written for it, is nevertheless the most neutral.
Music settles in it much as water does in a transparent, colorless crystal vessel.90
Ironically, Segovia as a guitarist was also the devotee of an equally-tempered instrument. But the hands-on
nature of the guitar allows for fine gradations of vibrato and coloristic shadings. For Segovia, this
circumvention of the neutrality of equal temperament allows the guitar to be the more expressive
instrument, and he claims that, "In it, the orchestra is refined and condensed, like a hundred forest perfumes
in a small bottle."
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And, over the course of the next century, the savage expressiveness of the electrified
version of the guitar would completely displace the piano as the dominant instrument of Western music.
Along with Rousseau, the world was waiting for a return to a more primitive and passionate musical
language.
89 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 181.
90
Andres Segovia, An Autobiography ofthe Years 1893-1920 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.,
1976), p. 17.
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Ibid., p. 18.
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